Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs), despite their impressive capabilities across domains, have been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Prior backdoor strategies predominantly operate at the token level, where an injected trigger causes the model to generate a specific target word, choice, or class (depending on the task). Recent advances, however, exploit the long-form reasoning tendencies of modern LLMs to conduct reasoning-level backdoors: once triggered, the victim model inserts one or more malicious reasoning steps into its chain-of-thought (CoT). These attacks are substantially harder to detect, as the backdoored answer remains plausible and consistent with the poisoned reasoning trajectory. Yet, defenses tailored to this type of backdoor remain largely unexplored. To bridge this gap, we propose Critical-CoT, a novel defense mechanism that conducts a two-stage fine-tuning (FT) process on LLMs to develop critical thinking behaviors, enabling them to automatically identify potential backdoors and refuse to generate malicious reasoning steps. Extensive experiments across multiple LLMs and datasets demonstrate that Critical-CoT provides strong robustness against both in-context learning-based and FT-based backdoor attacks. Notably, Critical-CoT exhibits strong cross-domain and cross-task generalization. Our code is available at hthttps://github.com/tuanvu171/Critical-CoT.

Agents based on large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in a wide range of complex, real-world applications. However, LLM agents with a compromised memory bank may easily produce harmful outputs when the past records retrieved for demonstration are malicious. In this paper, we propose a novel Memory INJection Attack, MINJA, that enables the injection of malicious records into the memory bank by only interacting with the agent via queries and output observations. These malicious records are designed to elicit a sequence of malicious reasoning steps leading to undesirable agent actions when executing the victim user's query. Specifically, we introduce a sequence of bridging steps to link the victim query to the malicious reasoning steps. During the injection of the malicious record, we propose an indication prompt to guide the agent to autonomously generate our designed bridging steps. We also propose a progressive shortening strategy that gradually removes the indication prompt, such that the malicious record will be easily retrieved when processing the victim query comes after. Our extensive experiments across diverse agents demonstrate the effectiveness of MINJA in compromising agent memory. With minimal requirements for execution, MINJA enables any user to influence agent memory, highlighting practical risks of LLM agents.

In this work, we propose BAIT (Boundary-Aware Iterative Trap), a three-step jailbreak framework that approaches malicious goals through internal disclosure. BAIT first asks the model to identify the protection boundary, then requires it to refine that boundary, and finally requests a detailed example. By expanding each step upon the model's previous responses, BAIT turns the model's own reasoning and consistency tendency into a disclosure pathway. Experiments on AdvBench, JailbreakBench, AIR-Bench, and SORRY-Bench demonstrate that BAIT consistently achieves strong attack success rates across top-tier large language models, significantly advancing conventional jailbreak baselines. Further analysis reveals that: 1) prevention-oriented framing significantly outperforms direct knowledge request; 2) the refinement step plays a critical role in disclosure escalation; and 3) the first two steps have a certain chance of eliciting harmful content while triggering little filtering.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated powerful capabilities that render them valuable in different applications, including conversational AI products. It is paramount to ensure the security and reliability of these products by mitigating their vulnerabilities towards malicious user interactions, which can lead to the exposure of great risks and reputational repercussions. In this work, we present a comprehensive study on the efficacy of fine-tuning and aligning Chain-of-Thought (CoT) responses of different LLMs that serve as input moderation guardrails. We systematically explore various tuning methods by leveraging a small set of training data to adapt these models as proxy defense mechanisms to detect malicious inputs and provide a reasoning for their verdicts, thereby preventing the exploitation of conversational agents. We rigorously evaluate the efficacy and robustness of different tuning strategies to generalize across diverse adversarial and malicious query types. Our experimental results outline the potential of alignment processes tailored to a varied range of harmful input queries, even with constrained data resources. These techniques significantly enhance the safety of conversational AI systems and provide a feasible framework for deploying more secure and trustworthy AI-driven interactions.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

Early research into data poisoning attacks against Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrated the ease with which backdoors could be injected. More recent LLMs add step-by-step reasoning, expanding the attack surface to include the intermediate chain-of-thought (CoT) and its inherent trait of decomposing problems into subproblems. Using these vectors for more stealthy poisoning, we introduce ``decomposed reasoning poison'', in which the attacker modifies only the reasoning path, leaving prompts and final answers clean, and splits the trigger across multiple, individually harmless components. Fascinatingly, while it remains possible to inject these decomposed poisons, reliably activating them to change final answers (rather than just the CoT) is surprisingly difficult. This difficulty arises because the models can often recover from backdoors that are activated within their thought processes. Ultimately, it appears that an emergent form of backdoor robustness is originating from the reasoning capabilities of these advanced LLMs, as well as from the architectural separation between reasoning and final answer generation.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly advanced beyond traditional Large Language Models (LLMs) with their exceptional logical reasoning capabilities, yet these improvements introduce heightened safety risks. When subjected to jailbreak attacks, their ability to generate more targeted and organized content can lead to greater harm. Although some studies claim that reasoning enables safer LRMs against existing LLM attacks, they overlook the inherent flaws within the reasoning process itself. To address this gap, we propose the first jailbreak attack targeting LRMs, exploiting their unique vulnerabilities stemming from the advanced reasoning capabilities. Specifically, we introduce a Chaos Machine, a novel component to transform attack prompts with diverse one-to-one mappings. The chaos mappings iteratively generated by the machine are embedded into the reasoning chain, which strengthens the variability and complexity and also promotes a more robust attack. Based on this, we construct the Mousetrap framework, which makes attacks projected into nonlinear-like low sample spaces with mismatched generalization enhanced. Also, due to the more competing objectives, LRMs gradually maintain the inertia of unpredictable iterative reasoning and fall into our trap. Success rates of the Mousetrap attacking o1-mini, Claude-Sonnet and Gemini-Thinking are as high as 96%, 86% and 98% respectively on our toxic dataset Trotter. On benchmarks such as AdvBench, StrongREJECT, and HarmBench, attacking Claude-Sonnet, well-known for its safety, Mousetrap can astonishingly achieve success rates of 87.5%, 86.58% and 93.13% respectively. Attention: This paper contains inappropriate, offensive and harmful content.

Although Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have progressed in solving complex problems, their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning often contains harmful content that can persist even when the final responses appear safe. We show that this issue still remains in existing methods which overlook the unique significance of safe reasoning, undermining their trustworthiness and posing potential risks in applications if unsafe reasoning is accessible for and exploited by malicious users. We therefore shift our focus to aligning the safety of reasoning itself in this paper and explore process supervision as the solution. However, simply rewarding safe reasoning proves inadequate due to low rollout diversity and limited training signals. To tackle this challenge, we first delve into the characteristics of safe reasoning and uncover several critical insights that 1) safe reasoning is often consolidated by a few critical steps of safety triggers; 2) compliance cues strongly correlate with unsafe continuations; and 3) corrective interventions reliably steer unsafe trajectories towards safer traces. Motivated by these, we propose Intervened Preference Optimization (IPO), an alignment method that enforces safe reasoning by substituting compliance steps with safety triggers and constructing pairs for preference learning with strong signals. Experiments on jailbreak and adversarial safety benchmarks demonstrate that IPO remarkably improves overall safety regarding both reasoning and responses, outperforming SFT-based and RL-based baselines with a relative reduction of over 30% in harmfulness, while preserving excellent performance across diverse reasoning tasks. The results highlight the importance of explicit alignment for reasoning and provide a practical path to safer LRMs.

Current LLM safety research predominantly focuses on mitigating Goal Hijacking, preventing attackers from redirecting a model's high-level objective (e.g., from "summarizing emails" to "phishing users"). In this paper, we argue that this perspective is incomplete and highlight a critical vulnerability in Reasoning Alignment. We propose a new adversarial paradigm: Reasoning Hijacking and instantiate it with Criteria Attack, which subverts model judgments by injecting spurious decision criteria without altering the high-level task goal. Unlike Goal Hijacking, which attempts to override the system prompt, Reasoning Hijacking accepts the high-level goal but manipulates the model's decision-making logic by injecting spurious reasoning shortcut. Though extensive experiments on three different tasks (toxic comment, negative review, and spam detection), we demonstrate that even newest models are prone to prioritize injected heuristic shortcuts over rigorous semantic analysis. The results are consistent over different backbones. Crucially, because the model's "intent" remains aligned with the user's instructions, these attacks can bypass defenses designed to detect goal deviation (e.g., SecAlign, StruQ), exposing a fundamental blind spot in the current safety landscape. Data and code are available at https://github.com/Yuan-Hou/criteria_attack

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have recently extended their powerful reasoning capabilities to safety checks-using chain-of-thought reasoning to decide whether a request should be answered. While this new approach offers a promising route for balancing model utility and safety, its robustness remains underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce Malicious-Educator, a benchmark that disguises extremely dangerous or malicious requests beneath seemingly legitimate educational prompts. Our experiments reveal severe security flaws in popular commercial-grade LRMs, including OpenAI o1/o3, DeepSeek-R1, and Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking. For instance, although OpenAI's o1 model initially maintains a high refusal rate of about 98%, subsequent model updates significantly compromise its safety; and attackers can easily extract criminal strategies from DeepSeek-R1 and Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking without any additional tricks. To further highlight these vulnerabilities, we propose Hijacking Chain-of-Thought (H-CoT), a universal and transferable attack method that leverages the model's own displayed intermediate reasoning to jailbreak its safety reasoning mechanism. Under H-CoT, refusal rates sharply decline-dropping from 98% to below 2%-and, in some instances, even transform initially cautious tones into ones that are willing to provide harmful content. We hope these findings underscore the urgent need for more robust safety mechanisms to preserve the benefits of advanced reasoning capabilities without compromising ethical standards.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) increasingly expose chain-of-thought-like reasoning for transparency, verification, and deliberate problem solving. This creates a safety blind spot: harmful or policy-violating content may appear in reasoning traces even when final answers appear safe. We test whether final-answer safety is a sufficient proxy for the full reasoning-answer trajectory by scoring both stages under a unified twenty-principle safety rubric. Using prompts from seven public harmfulness and jailbreak sources, plus four out-of-distribution (OOD) sources, we evaluate 15 open-weight and API-based LRMs across 41K prompts per model. Reasoning traces consistently reveal additional safety risks beyond final answers, especially in high-severity stage-wise failures: leak cases, where unsafe reasoning precedes a safe-looking answer, and escape cases, where benign-looking reasoning precedes an unsafe final response. Principle-level analysis shows that risk concentrates in misinformation, legal compliance, discrimination, physical harm, and psychological harm. We further propose adaptive multi-principle steering, a white-box test-time mitigation that learns one unsafe-to-safe activation direction per safety principle and activates only directions whose current hidden state is closer to the unsafe than safe centroid. On three steerable open reasoning models, adaptive steering reduces unsafe counts in both reasoning traces and final answers on held-out and OOD benchmarks. DeepSeek-R1-Qwen-7B achieves a 40.8% average unsafe-count reduction while retaining 97.7% macro-averaged accuracy on BBH, GSM8K, and MMLU. These results suggest that LRM safety should be evaluated and mitigated over the full exposed reasoning-answer trajectory, not only at the final-answer stage.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly important for machine learning applications. However, it can be challenging to align LLMs with our intent, particularly when we want to generate content that is preferable over others or when we want the LLM to respond in a certain style or tone that is hard to describe. To address this challenge, we propose an approach that uses contrastive examples to better describe our intent. This involves providing positive examples that illustrate the true intent, along with negative examples that show what characteristics we want LLMs to avoid. The negative examples can be retrieved from labeled data, written by a human, or generated by the LLM itself. Before generating an answer, we ask the model to analyze the examples to teach itself what to avoid. This reasoning step provides the model with the appropriate articulation of the user's need and guides it towards generting a better answer. We tested our approach on both synthesized and real-world datasets, including StackExchange and Reddit, and found that it significantly improves performance compared to standard few-shot prompting

In this paper, we introduce a new process prejudge strategy in LLM reasoning to demonstrate that bootstrapping with process prejudge allows the LLM to adaptively anticipate the errors encountered when advancing the subsequent reasoning steps, similar to people sometimes pausing to think about what mistakes may occur and how to avoid them, rather than relying solely on trial and error. Specifically, we define a prejudge node in the rationale, which represents a reasoning step, with at least one step that follows the prejudge node that has no paths toward the correct answer. To synthesize the prejudge reasoning process, we present an automated reasoning framework with a dynamic tree-searching strategy. This framework requires only one LLM to perform answer judging, response critiquing, prejudge generation, and thought completion. Furthermore, we develop a two-phase training mechanism with supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL) to further enhance the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. Experimental results from competition-level complex reasoning demonstrate that our method can teach the model to prejudge before thinking and significantly enhance the reasoning ability of LLMs. Code and data is released at https://github.com/wjn1996/Prejudge-Before-Think.

Recent large language models (LLMs) can generate long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) at test time, enabling them to solve complex tasks. These reasoning steps in CoT are often assumed as a faithful reflection of the model's internal thinking process, and used to monitor unsafe intentions. However, we find many reasoning steps don't truly contribute to LLMs' prediction. We measure the step-wise causal influence of each reasoning step on the model's final prediction with a proposed True Thinking Score (TTS). We reveal that LLMs often interleave between true-thinking steps (which are genuinely used to produce the final output) and decorative-thinking steps (which only give the appearance of reasoning but have minimal causal impact). Notably, only a small subset of the total reasoning steps have a high TTS that causally drive the model's prediction: e.g., for the AIME dataset, only an average of 2.3% of reasoning steps in CoT have a TTS >= 0.7 (range: 0-1) under the Qwen-2.5 model. Furthermore, we identify a TrueThinking direction in the latent space of LLMs. By steering along or against this direction, we can force the model to perform or disregard certain CoT steps when computing the final result. Finally, we highlight that self-verification steps in CoT (i.e., aha moments) can also be decorative, where LLMs do not truly verify their solution. Steering along the TrueThinking direction can force internal reasoning over these steps, resulting in a change in the final results. Overall, our work reveals that LLMs often verbalize reasoning steps without actually performing them internally, which undermines both the efficiency of LLM reasoning and the trustworthiness of CoT.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents equipped with external tools have become increasingly powerful for complex tasks such as web shopping, automated email replies, and financial trading. However, these advancements amplify the risks of adversarial attacks, especially when agents can access sensitive external functionalities. Nevertheless, manipulating LLM agents into performing targeted malicious actions or invoking specific tools remains challenging, as these agents extensively reason or plan before executing final actions. In this work, we present UDora, a unified red teaming framework designed for LLM agents that dynamically hijacks the agent's reasoning processes to compel malicious behavior. Specifically, UDora first generates the model's reasoning trace for the given task, then automatically identifies optimal points within this trace to insert targeted perturbations. The resulting perturbed reasoning is then used as a surrogate response for optimization. By iteratively applying this process, the LLM agent will then be induced to undertake designated malicious actions or to invoke specific malicious tools. Our approach demonstrates superior effectiveness compared to existing methods across three LLM agent datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/AI-secure/UDora.

Large Language Model safety alignment predominantly operates on a binary assumption that requests are either safe or unsafe. This classification proves insufficient when models encounter ethical dilemmas, where the capacity to reason through moral trade-offs creates a distinct attack surface. We formalize this vulnerability through TRIAL, a multi-turn red-teaming methodology that embeds harmful requests within ethical framings. TRIAL achieves high attack success rates across most tested models by systematically exploiting the model's ethical reasoning capabilities to frame harmful actions as morally necessary compromises. Building on these insights, we introduce ERR (Ethical Reasoning Robustness), a defense framework that distinguishes between instrumental responses that enable harmful outcomes and explanatory responses that analyze ethical frameworks without endorsing harmful acts. ERR employs a Layer-Stratified Harm-Gated LoRA architecture, achieving robust defense against reasoning-based attacks while preserving model utility.

We study privacy leakage in the reasoning traces of large reasoning models used as personal agents. Unlike final outputs, reasoning traces are often assumed to be internal and safe. We challenge this assumption by showing that reasoning traces frequently contain sensitive user data, which can be extracted via prompt injections or accidentally leak into outputs. Through probing and agentic evaluations, we demonstrate that test-time compute approaches, particularly increased reasoning steps, amplify such leakage. While increasing the budget of those test-time compute approaches makes models more cautious in their final answers, it also leads them to reason more verbosely and leak more in their own thinking. This reveals a core tension: reasoning improves utility but enlarges the privacy attack surface. We argue that safety efforts must extend to the model's internal thinking, not just its outputs.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

Large Language Models (LLMs) significantly benefit from Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting in performing various reasoning tasks. While CoT allows models to produce more comprehensive reasoning processes, its emphasis on intermediate reasoning steps can inadvertently introduce hallucinations and accumulated errors, thereby limiting models' ability to solve complex reasoning tasks. Inspired by how humans engage in careful and meticulous deductive logical reasoning processes to solve tasks, we seek to enable language models to perform explicit and rigorous deductive reasoning, and also ensure the trustworthiness of their reasoning process through self-verification. However, directly verifying the validity of an entire deductive reasoning process is challenging, even with advanced models like ChatGPT. In light of this, we propose to decompose a reasoning verification process into a series of step-by-step subprocesses, each only receiving their necessary context and premises. To facilitate this procedure, we propose Natural Program, a natural language-based deductive reasoning format. Our approach enables models to generate precise reasoning steps where subsequent steps are more rigorously grounded on prior steps. It also empowers language models to carry out reasoning self-verification in a step-by-step manner. By integrating this verification process into each deductive reasoning stage, we significantly enhance the rigor and trustfulness of generated reasoning steps. Along this process, we also improve the answer correctness on complex reasoning tasks. Code will be released at https://github.com/lz1oceani/verify_cot.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) extend large language models with explicit multi-step reasoning traces, but this capability introduces a new class of prompt-induced inference-time denial-of-service (PI-DoS) attacks that exploit the high computational cost of reasoning. We first formalize inference cost for LRMs and define PI-DoS, then prove that any practical PI-DoS attack should satisfy three properties: (1) a high amplification ratio, where each query induces a disproportionately long reasoning trace relative to its own length; (ii) stealthiness, in which prompts and responses remain on the natural language manifold and evade distribution shift detectors; and (iii) optimizability, in which the attack supports efficient optimization without being slowed by its own success. Under this framework, we present ReasoningBomb, a reinforcement-learning-based PI-DoS framework that is guided by a constant-time surrogate reward and trains a large reasoning-model attacker to generate short natural prompts that drive victim LRMs into pathologically long and often effectively non-terminating reasoning. Across seven open-source models (including LLMs and LRMs) and three commercial LRMs, ReasoningBomb induces 18,759 completion tokens on average and 19,263 reasoning tokens on average across reasoning models. It outperforms the the runner-up baseline by 35% in completion tokens and 38% in reasoning tokens, while inducing 6-7x more tokens than benign queries and achieving 286.7x input-to-output amplification ratio averaged across all samples. Additionally, our method achieves 99.8% bypass rate on input-based detection, 98.7% on output-based detection, and 98.4% against strict dual-stage joint detection.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have emerged as a significant advancement in artificial intelligence, representing a specialized class of large language models (LLMs) designed to tackle complex reasoning tasks. The defining characteristic of LRMs lies in their extensive chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capabilities. In this paper, we identify a previously unexplored attack vector against LRMs, which we term "overthinking backdoors". We advance this concept by proposing a novel tunable backdoor, which moves beyond simple on/off attacks to one where an attacker can precisely control the extent of the model's reasoning verbosity. Our attack is implemented through a novel data poisoning methodology. It pairs a tunable trigger-where the number of repetitions signals the desired intensity-with a correspondingly verbose CoT response. These responses are programmatically generated by instructing a teacher LLM to inject a controlled number of redundant refinement steps into a correct reasoning process. The approach preserves output correctness, which ensures stealth and establishes the attack as a pure resource-consumption vector. Extensive empirical results on various LRMs demonstrate that our method can reliably trigger a controllable, multi-fold increase in the length of the reasoning process, without degrading the final answer's correctness. Our source code is available at https://github.com/FZaKK/BadReasoner.

The increasing sophistication of large vision-language models (LVLMs) has been accompanied by advances in safety alignment mechanisms designed to prevent harmful content generation. However, these defenses remain vulnerable to sophisticated adversarial attacks. Existing jailbreak methods typically rely on direct and semantically explicit prompts, overlooking subtle vulnerabilities in how LVLMs compose information over multiple reasoning steps. In this paper, we propose a novel and effective jailbreak framework inspired by Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) techniques from software security. Our approach decomposes a harmful instruction into a sequence of individually benign visual gadgets. A carefully engineered textual prompt directs the sequence of inputs, prompting the model to integrate the benign visual gadgets through its reasoning process to produce a coherent and harmful output. This makes the malicious intent emergent and difficult to detect from any single component. We validate our method through extensive experiments on established benchmarks including SafeBench and MM-SafetyBench, targeting popular LVLMs. Results show that our approach consistently and substantially outperforms existing baselines on state-of-the-art models, achieving near-perfect attack success rates (over 0.90 on SafeBench) and improving ASR by up to 0.39. Our findings reveal a critical and underexplored vulnerability that exploits the compositional reasoning abilities of LVLMs, highlighting the urgent need for defenses that secure the entire reasoning process.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have led to increasingly sophisticated safety protocols and features designed to prevent harmful, unethical, or unauthorized outputs. However, these guardrails remain susceptible to novel and creative forms of adversarial prompting, including manually generated test cases. In this work, we present two new test cases in mental health for (i) suicide and (ii) self-harm, using multi-step, prompt-level jailbreaking and bypass built-in content and safety filters. We show that user intent is disregarded, leading to the generation of detailed harmful content and instructions that could cause real-world harm. We conduct an empirical evaluation across six widely available LLMs, demonstrating the generalizability and reliability of the bypass. We assess these findings and the multilayered ethical tensions that they present for their implications on prompt-response filtering and context- and task-specific model development. We recommend a more comprehensive and systematic approach to AI safety and ethics while emphasizing the need for continuous adversarial testing in safety-critical AI deployments. We also argue that while certain clearly defined safety measures and guardrails can and must be implemented in LLMs, ensuring robust and comprehensive safety across all use cases and domains remains extremely challenging given the current technical maturity of general-purpose LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) showcase impressive reasoning capabilities when coupled with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. However, the robustness of this approach warrants further investigation. In this paper, we introduce a novel scenario termed preemptive answers, where the LLM obtains an answer before engaging in reasoning. This situation can arise inadvertently or induced by malicious users by prompt injection attacks. Experiments reveal that preemptive answers significantly impair the model's reasoning capability across various CoT methods and a broad spectrum of datasets. To bolster the robustness of reasoning, we propose two measures aimed at mitigating this issue to some extent.

As large language models (LLMs) transition to autonomous agents synthesizing real-time information, their reasoning capabilities introduce an unexpected attack surface. This paper introduces a novel threat where colluding agents steer victim beliefs using only truthful evidence fragments distributed through public channels, without relying on covert communications, backdoors, or falsified documents. By exploiting LLMs' overthinking tendency, we formalize the first cognitive collusion attack and propose Generative Montage: a Writer-Editor-Director framework that constructs deceptive narratives through adversarial debate and coordinated posting of evidence fragments, causing victims to internalize and propagate fabricated conclusions. To study this risk, we develop CoPHEME, a dataset derived from real-world rumor events, and simulate attacks across diverse LLM families. Our results show pervasive vulnerability across 14 LLM families: attack success rates reach 74.4% for proprietary models and 70.6% for open-weights models. Counterintuitively, stronger reasoning capabilities increase susceptibility, with reasoning-specialized models showing higher attack success than base models or prompts. Furthermore, these false beliefs then cascade to downstream judges, achieving over 60% deception rates, highlighting a socio-technical vulnerability in how LLM-based agents interact with dynamic information environments. Our implementation and data are available at: https://github.com/CharlesJW222/Lying_with_Truth/tree/main.

Malicious attackers can exploit large language models (LLMs) by engaging them in multi-turn dialogues to achieve harmful objectives, posing significant safety risks to society. To address this challenge, we propose a novel defense mechanism: SafeTy Reasoning Elicitation Alignment for Multi-Turn Dialogues (STREAM). STREAM defends LLMs against multi-turn attacks while preserving their functional capabilities. Our approach involves constructing a human-annotated dataset, the Safety Reasoning Multi-turn Dialogues dataset, which is used to fine-tune a plug-and-play safety reasoning moderator. This model is designed to identify malicious intent hidden within multi-turn conversations and alert the target LLM of potential risks. We evaluate STREAM across multiple LLMs against prevalent multi-turn attack strategies. Experimental results demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms existing defense techniques, reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) by 51.2%, all while maintaining comparable LLM capability.

Large language models, despite extensive alignment with human values and ethical principles, remain vulnerable to sophisticated jailbreak attacks that exploit their reasoning abilities. Existing safety measures often detect overt malicious intent but fail to address subtle, reasoning-driven vulnerabilities. In this work, we introduce POATE (Polar Opposite query generation, Adversarial Template construction, and Elaboration), a novel jailbreak technique that harnesses contrastive reasoning to provoke unethical responses. POATE crafts semantically opposing intents and integrates them with adversarial templates, steering models toward harmful outputs with remarkable subtlety. We conduct extensive evaluation across six diverse language model families of varying parameter sizes to demonstrate the robustness of the attack, achieving significantly higher attack success rates (~44%) compared to existing methods. To counter this, we propose Intent-Aware CoT and Reverse Thinking CoT, which decompose queries to detect malicious intent and reason in reverse to evaluate and reject harmful responses. These methods enhance reasoning robustness and strengthen the model's defense against adversarial exploits.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate strong performance on complex tasks but often suffer from excessive verbosity, known as "overthinking." Existing solutions via reinforcement learning (RL) typically penalize generated tokens to promote conciseness. However, these methods encounter two challenges: responses with fewer tokens do not always correspond to fewer reasoning steps, and models may develop hacking behavior in later stages of training by discarding reasoning steps to minimize token usage. In this work, we introduce Step Pruner (SP), an RL framework that steers LRMs toward more efficient reasoning by favoring compact reasoning steps. Our step-aware reward function prioritizes correctness while imposing penalties for redundant steps, and withholds rewards for incorrect responses to prevent the reinforcement of erroneous reasoning. Moreover, we propose a dynamic stopping mechanism: when the length of any output step exceeds the upper limit, we halt updates to prevent hacking behavior caused by merging steps. Extensive experiments across four reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that SP achieves state-of-the-art accuracy while significantly reducing response length. For instance, on AIME24, SP reduces token usage by 69.7\%.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently achieved significant progress in complex reasoning tasks, aided by reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards. However, LRMs often suffer from overthinking, expending excessive computation on simple problems and reducing efficiency. Existing efficient reasoning methods typically require accurate task assessment to preset token budgets or select reasoning modes, which limits their flexibility and reliability. In this work, we revisit the essence of overthinking and identify that encouraging effective steps while penalizing ineffective ones is key to its solution. To this end, we propose a novel rule-based verifiable stepwise reward mechanism (VSRM), which assigns rewards based on the performance of intermediate states in the reasoning trajectory. This approach is intuitive and naturally fits the step-by-step nature of reasoning tasks. We conduct extensive experiments on standard mathematical reasoning benchmarks, including AIME24 and AIME25, by integrating VSRM with PPO and Reinforce++. Results show that our method achieves substantial output length reduction while maintaining original reasoning performance, striking an optimal balance between efficiency and accuracy. Further analysis of overthinking frequency and pass@k score before and after training demonstrates that our approach in deed effectively suppresses ineffective steps and encourages effective reasoning, fundamentally alleviating the overthinking problem. All code will be released upon acceptance.

LLMs are trained to refuse harmful instructions, but do they truly understand harmfulness beyond just refusing? Prior work has shown that LLMs' refusal behaviors can be mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, i.e., a refusal direction. In this work, we identify a new dimension to analyze safety mechanisms in LLMs, i.e., harmfulness, which is encoded internally as a separate concept from refusal. There exists a harmfulness direction that is distinct from the refusal direction. As causal evidence, steering along the harmfulness direction can lead LLMs to interpret harmless instructions as harmful, but steering along the refusal direction tends to elicit refusal responses directly without reversing the model's judgment on harmfulness. Furthermore, using our identified harmfulness concept, we find that certain jailbreak methods work by reducing the refusal signals without reversing the model's internal belief of harmfulness. We also find that adversarially finetuning models to accept harmful instructions has minimal impact on the model's internal belief of harmfulness. These insights lead to a practical safety application: The model's latent harmfulness representation can serve as an intrinsic safeguard (Latent Guard) for detecting unsafe inputs and reducing over-refusals that is robust to finetuning attacks. For instance, our Latent Guard achieves performance comparable to or better than Llama Guard 3 8B, a dedicated finetuned safeguard model, across different jailbreak methods. Our findings suggest that LLMs' internal understanding of harmfulness is more robust than their refusal decision to diverse input instructions, offering a new perspective to study AI safety

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have become powerful tools for complex problem solving, but their structured reasoning pathways can lead to unsafe outputs when exposed to harmful prompts. Existing safety alignment methods reduce harmful outputs but can degrade reasoning depth, leading to significant trade-offs in complex, multi-step tasks, and remain vulnerable to sophisticated jailbreak attacks. To address this, we introduce SAFEPATH, a lightweight alignment method that fine-tunes LRMs to emit a short, 8-token Safety Primer at the start of their reasoning, in response to harmful prompts, while leaving the rest of the reasoning process unsupervised. Empirical results across multiple benchmarks indicate that SAFEPATH effectively reduces harmful outputs while maintaining reasoning performance. Specifically, SAFEPATH reduces harmful responses by up to 90.0% and blocks 83.3% of jailbreak attempts in the DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B model, while requiring 295.9x less compute than Direct Refusal and 314.1x less than SafeChain. We further introduce a zero-shot variant that requires no fine-tuning. In addition, we provide a comprehensive analysis of how existing methods in LLMs generalize, or fail, when applied to reasoning-centric models, revealing critical gaps and new directions for safer AI.

Persistent memory has enabled large language model (LLM) agents to store factual knowledge, prior decisions, reasoning histories, tool usage information, and context. While this has improved the agent's functionality and continuity across tasks, it has also introduced a new attack surface: the agent's own reasoning history. In this paper, we introduce the Forged Amplifying Rationale Memory Attack (FARMA), which poisons an agent's remembered reasoning rather than its factual knowledge. It inserts forged reasoning traces using evasive language that bypasses keyword-based defenses, then amplifies them through self-referential reinforcement that defeats consensus-based defenses. To address FARMA, we introduce SENTINEL, a layered defense pipeline to detect forged reasoning entries. Its central component is the Reasoning Guard that structurally analyzes candidate entries for forgery using five weighted signals. We evaluate FARMA and SENTINEL across multiple agents and different LLM models with 50 trials and show that FARMA achieves an attack success rate of up to 100% under baseline conditions and is capable of defeating defense mechanisms like keyword filter and A-MemGuard. Our evaluation also shows that SENTINEL reduces FARMA's attack success rate to as low as 0% with no false positives observed across 326 benign agent traces. Our work demonstrates the need to protect not only an agent's retrieved content but also the integrity of its reasoning history.

Recent work has highlighted the importance of monitoring chain-of-thought reasoning for AI safety; however, current approaches that analyze textual reasoning steps can miss subtle harmful patterns and may be circumvented by models that hide unsafe reasoning. We present a sentence-level labeled dataset that enables activation-based monitoring of safety behaviors during LLM reasoning. Our dataset contains reasoning sequences with sentence-level annotations of safety behaviors such as expression of safety concerns or speculation on user intent, which we use to extract steering vectors for detecting and influencing these behaviors within model activations. The dataset fills a key gap in safety research: while existing datasets label reasoning holistically, effective application of steering vectors for safety monitoring could be improved by identifying precisely when specific behaviors occur within reasoning chains. We demonstrate the dataset's utility by extracting representations that both detect and steer safety behaviors in model activations, showcasing the potential of activation-level techniques for improving safety oversight on reasoning. Content Warning: This paper discusses AI safety in the context of harmful prompts and may contain references to potentially harmful content.

Monitoring autonomous large language model (LLM) agents for covert malicious behavior is challenging due to delayed, context-dependent, and long-horizon attack patterns. Agents may pursue hidden objectives while maintaining superficially benign behavior, making detection difficult even with full trajectory access. Prior monitoring approaches improve scaffolding or ensemble aggregation, but treat each trajectory independently and do not learn from prior monitoring experience. Moreover, standard reasoning methods explain observed behavior without explicitly reasoning about agent beliefs, intentions, and goal alignment required to distinguish benign task execution from covert deviation. We propose Agent-ToM, a learning-to-monitor framework grounded in Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning for security analysis of autonomous agents. Agent-ToM performs structured full-trajectory analysis by inferring beliefs, intent hypotheses with calibrated confidence, expected actions, and deviations from task-consistent behavioral baselines. At inference time, it employs a Reason-Verify-Refine pipeline to construct and validate monitoring decisions. At training time, Agent-ToM distills critique signals into a persistent semantic guardrail memory, enabling reusable belief- and intent-conditioned constraints across episodes. We evaluate Agent-ToM on adversarial agent monitoring benchmarks (SHADE-Arena and CUA-SHADE-Arena). Agent-ToM achieves strong precision-recall balance and outperforms state-of-the-art monitoring baselines, including ensemble methods, while using a coherent two-call reasoning pipeline. These results demonstrate that learning at the monitoring layer, combined with structured ToM reasoning and verification, provides an effective and deployable foundation for securing autonomous LLM agents.

Recently, Zaremba et al. demonstrated that increasing inference-time computation improves robustness in large proprietary reasoning LLMs. In this paper, we first show that smaller-scale, open-source models (e.g., DeepSeek R1, Qwen3, Phi-reasoning) can also benefit from inference-time scaling using a simple budget forcing strategy. More importantly, we reveal and critically examine an implicit assumption in prior work: intermediate reasoning steps are hidden from adversaries. By relaxing this assumption, we identify an important security risk, intuitively motivated and empirically verified as an inverse scaling law: if intermediate reasoning steps become explicitly accessible, increased inference-time computation consistently reduces model robustness. Finally, we discuss practical scenarios where models with hidden reasoning chains are still vulnerable to attacks, such as models with tool-integrated reasoning and advanced reasoning extraction attacks. Our findings collectively demonstrate that the robustness benefits of inference-time scaling depend heavily on the adversarial setting and deployment context. We urge practitioners to carefully weigh these subtle trade-offs before applying inference-time scaling in security-sensitive, real-world applications.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated promising performance in complex tasks. However, the resource-consuming reasoning processes may be exploited by attackers to maliciously occupy the resources of the servers, leading to a crash, like the DDoS attack in cyber. To this end, we propose a novel attack method on LRMs termed ExtendAttack to maliciously occupy the resources of servers by stealthily extending the reasoning processes of LRMs. Concretely, we systematically obfuscate characters within a benign prompt, transforming them into a complex, poly-base ASCII representation. This compels the model to perform a series of computationally intensive decoding sub-tasks that are deeply embedded within the semantic structure of the query itself. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed ExtendAttack. Remarkably, it significantly increases response length and latency, with the former increasing by over 2.7 times for the o3 model on the HumanEval benchmark. Besides, it preserves the original meaning of the query and achieves comparable answer accuracy, showing the stealthiness.

Current LLM safety defenses fail under decomposition attacks, where a malicious goal is decomposed into benign subtasks that circumvent refusals. The challenge lies in the existing shallow safety alignment techniques: they only detect harm in the immediate prompt and do not reason about long-range intent, leaving them blind to malicious intent that emerges over a sequence of seemingly benign instructions. We therefore propose adding an external monitor that observes the conversation at a higher granularity. To facilitate our study of monitoring decomposition attacks, we curate the largest and most diverse dataset to date, including question-answering, text-to-image, and agentic tasks. We verify our datasets by testing them on frontier LLMs and show an 87% attack success rate on average on GPT-4o. This confirms that decomposition attack is broadly effective. Additionally, we find that random tasks can be injected into the decomposed subtasks to further obfuscate malicious intents. To defend in real time, we propose a lightweight sequential monitoring framework that cumulatively evaluates each subtask. We show that a carefully prompt engineered lightweight monitor achieves a 93% defense success rate, beating reasoning models like o3 mini as a monitor. Moreover, it remains robust against random task injection and cuts cost by 90% and latency by 50%. Our findings suggest that lightweight sequential monitors are highly effective in mitigating decomposition attacks and are viable in deployment.

Recent reasoning-based safety guardrails for Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), such as deliberative alignment, have shown strong defense against jailbreak attacks. By leveraging LRMs' reasoning ability, these guardrails help the models to assess the safety of user inputs before generating final responses. The powerful reasoning ability can analyze the intention of the input query and will refuse to assist once it detects the harmful intent hidden by the jailbreak methods. Such guardrails have shown a significant boost in defense, such as the near-perfect refusal rates on the open-source gpt-oss series. Unfortunately, we find that these powerful reasoning-based guardrails can be extremely vulnerable to subtle manipulation of the input prompts, and once hijacked, can lead to even more harmful results. Specifically, we first uncover a surprisingly fragile aspect of these guardrails: simply adding a few template tokens to the input prompt can successfully bypass the seemingly powerful guardrails and lead to explicit and harmful responses. To explore further, we introduce a bag of jailbreak methods that subvert the reasoning-based guardrails. Our attacks span white-, gray-, and black-box settings and range from effortless template manipulations to fully automated optimization. Along with the potential for scalable implementation, these methods also achieve alarmingly high attack success rates (e.g., exceeding 90% across 5 different benchmarks on gpt-oss series on both local host models and online API services). Evaluations across various leading open-source LRMs confirm that these vulnerabilities are systemic, underscoring the urgent need for stronger alignment techniques for open-sourced LRMs to prevent malicious misuse. Code is open-sourced at https://chenxshuo.github.io/bag-of-tricks.

Hidden malicious intent in multi-turn dialogue poses a growing threat to deployed large language models (LLMs). Rather than exposing a harmful objective in a single prompt, increasingly capable attackers can distribute their intent across multiple benign-looking turns. Recent studies show that even modern commercial models with advanced guardrails remain vulnerable to such attacks despite advances in safety alignment and external guardrails. In this work, we address this challenge by detecting the earliest turn at which delivering the candidate response would make the accumulated interaction sufficient to enable harmful action. This objective requires precise turn-level intervention that identifies the harm-enabling closure point while avoiding premature refusal of benign exploratory conversations. To further support training and evaluation, we construct the Multi-Turn Intent Dataset (MTID), which contains branching attack rollouts, matched benign hard negatives, and annotations of the earliest harm-enabling turns. We show that MTID helps enable a turn-level monitor TurnGate, which substantially outperforms existing baselines in harmful-intent detection while maintaining low over-refusal rates. TurnGate further generalizes across domains, attacker pipelines, and target models. Our code is available at https://github.com/Graph-COM/TurnGate.

Reasoning is a fundamental cognitive process that enables logical inference, problem-solving, and decision-making. With the rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs), reasoning has emerged as a key capability that distinguishes advanced AI systems from conventional models that empower chatbots. In this survey, we categorize existing methods along two orthogonal dimensions: (1) Regimes, which define the stage at which reasoning is achieved (either at inference time or through dedicated training); and (2) Architectures, which determine the components involved in the reasoning process, distinguishing between standalone LLMs and agentic compound systems that incorporate external tools, and multi-agent collaborations. Within each dimension, we analyze two key perspectives: (1) Input level, which focuses on techniques that construct high-quality prompts that the LLM condition on; and (2) Output level, which methods that refine multiple sampled candidates to enhance reasoning quality. This categorization provides a systematic understanding of the evolving landscape of LLM reasoning, highlighting emerging trends such as the shift from inference-scaling to learning-to-reason (e.g., DeepSeek-R1), and the transition to agentic workflows (e.g., OpenAI Deep Research, Manus Agent). Additionally, we cover a broad spectrum of learning algorithms, from supervised fine-tuning to reinforcement learning such as PPO and GRPO, and the training of reasoners and verifiers. We also examine key designs of agentic workflows, from established patterns like generator-evaluator and LLM debate to recent innovations. ...

We increase overhead for applications that rely on reasoning LLMs-we force models to spend an amplified number of reasoning tokens, i.e., "overthink", to respond to the user query while providing contextually correct answers. The adversary performs an OVERTHINK attack by injecting decoy reasoning problems into the public content that is used by the reasoning LLM (e.g., for RAG applications) during inference time. Due to the nature of our decoy problems (e.g., a Markov Decision Process), modified texts do not violate safety guardrails. We evaluated our attack across closed-(OpenAI o1, o1-mini, o3-mini) and open-(DeepSeek R1) weights reasoning models on the FreshQA and SQuAD datasets. Our results show up to 18x slowdown on FreshQA dataset and 46x slowdown on SQuAD dataset. The attack also shows high transferability across models. To protect applications, we discuss and implement defenses leveraging LLM-based and system design approaches. Finally, we discuss societal, financial, and energy impacts of OVERTHINK attack which could amplify the costs for third-party applications operating reasoning models.

Reasoning is central to a wide range of intellectual activities, and while the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, their performance in reasoning tasks remains limited. The processes and mechanisms underlying reasoning are not yet fully understood, but key elements include path exploration, selection of relevant knowledge, and multi-step inference. Problems are solved through the synthesis of these components. In this paper, we propose a benchmark that focuses on a specific aspect of reasoning ability: the direct evaluation of multi-step inference. To this end, we design a special reasoning task where multi-step inference is specifically focused by largely eliminating path exploration and implicit knowledge utilization. Our dataset comprises pairs of explicit instructions and corresponding questions, where the procedures necessary for solving the questions are entirely detailed within the instructions. This setup allows models to solve problems solely by following the provided directives. By constructing problems that require varying numbers of steps to solve and evaluating responses at each step, we enable a thorough assessment of state-of-the-art LLMs' ability to follow instructions. To ensure the robustness of our evaluation, we include multiple distinct tasks. Furthermore, by comparing accuracy across tasks, utilizing step-aware metrics, and applying separately defined measures of complexity, we conduct experiments that offer insights into the capabilities and limitations of LLMs in reasoning tasks. Our findings have significant implications for the development of LLMs and highlight areas for future research in advancing their reasoning abilities. Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ifujisawa/procbench and code at https://github.com/ifujisawa/proc-bench.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

Situational awareness, the capacity of an AI system to recognize its own nature, understand its training and deployment context, and reason strategically about its circumstances, is widely considered among the most dangerous emergent capabilities in advanced AI systems. Separately, a growing research effort seeks to improve the logical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) across deduction, induction, and abduction. In this paper, we argue that these two research trajectories are on a collision course. We introduce the RAISE framework (Reasoning Advancing Into Self Examination), which identifies three mechanistic pathways through which improvements in logical reasoning enable progressively deeper levels of situational awareness: deductive self inference, inductive context recognition, and abductive self modeling. We formalize each pathway, construct an escalation ladder from basic self recognition to strategic deception, and demonstrate that every major research topic in LLM logical reasoning maps directly onto a specific amplifier of situational awareness. We further analyze why current safety measures are insufficient to prevent this escalation. We conclude by proposing concrete safeguards, including a "Mirror Test" benchmark and a Reasoning Safety Parity Principle, and pose an uncomfortable but necessary question to the logical reasoning community about its responsibility in this trajectory.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, particularly in the face of stealthy and complex jailbreaks, presents a formidable challenge. In this study, we present a simple yet highly effective defense strategy, i.e., Intention Analysis Prompting (IAPrompt). The principle behind is to trigger LLMs' inherent self-correct and improve ability through a two-stage process: 1) essential intention analysis, and 2) policy-aligned response. Notably, IAPrompt is an inference-only method, thus could enhance the safety of LLMs without compromising their helpfulness. Extensive experiments on SAP200 and DAN benchmarks across Vicuna, ChatGLM, MPT, DeepSeek, and GPT-3.5 show that IAPrompt could consistently and significantly reduce the harmfulness in response (averagely -46.5% attack success rate) and maintain the general helpfulness. Further analyses present some insights into how our method works. To facilitate reproducibility, We release our code and scripts at: https://github.com/alphadl/SafeLLM_with_IntentionAnalysis

Moral sensitivity is fundamental to human moral competence, as it guides individuals in regulating everyday behavior. Although many approaches seek to align large language models (LLMs) with human moral values, how to enable them morally sensitive has been extremely challenging. In this paper, we take a step toward answering the question: how can we enhance moral sensitivity in LLMs? Specifically, we propose two pragmatic inference methods that faciliate LLMs to diagnose morally benign and hazardous input and correct moral errors, whereby enhancing LLMs' moral sensitivity. A central strength of our pragmatic inference methods is their unified perspective: instead of modeling moral discourses across semantically diverse and complex surface forms, they offer a principled perspective for designing pragmatic inference procedures grounded in their inferential loads. Empirical evidence demonstrates that our pragmatic methods can enhance moral sensitivity in LLMs and achieves strong performance on representative morality-relevant benchmarks.

The safety and alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) are critical for their responsible deployment. Current evaluation methods predominantly focus on identifying and preventing overtly harmful outputs. However, they often fail to address a more insidious failure mode: models that produce benign-appearing outputs while operating on malicious or deceptive internal reasoning. This vulnerability, often triggered by sophisticated system prompt injections, allows models to bypass conventional safety filters, posing a significant, underexplored risk. To address this gap, we introduce the Deceptive Reasoning Exposure Suite (D-REX), a novel dataset designed to evaluate the discrepancy between a model's internal reasoning process and its final output. D-REX was constructed through a competitive red-teaming exercise where participants crafted adversarial system prompts to induce such deceptive behaviors. Each sample in D-REX contains the adversarial system prompt, an end-user's test query, the model's seemingly innocuous response, and, crucially, the model's internal chain-of-thought, which reveals the underlying malicious intent. Our benchmark facilitates a new, essential evaluation task: the detection of deceptive alignment. We demonstrate that D-REX presents a significant challenge for existing models and safety mechanisms, highlighting the urgent need for new techniques that scrutinize the internal processes of LLMs, not just their final outputs.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

LLM reasoning traces suffer from complex flaws -- *Step Internal Flaws* (logical errors, hallucinations, etc.) and *Step-wise Flaws* (overthinking, underthinking), which vary by sample. A natural approach would be to provide ground-truth labels to guide LLMs' reasoning. Contrary to intuition, we show that this yields no improvement in reasoning ability. We then propose CRAFT, a unified framework that mitigates both types of Step flaws, which builds a Reasoning Knowledge Graph (RKG) based on the consensus parts of multiple candidate traces, and synthesizes a high-quality trace through topological generation. Our approach improves label-prediction accuracy by 10+% on average, and consistently outperforms all baselines across both logical and mathematical reasoning benchmarks. Further, detailed benchmark evaluation proves that our method also improves the quality of LLMs' reasoning traces in multiple dimensions.

Exploiting large language models (LLMs) to tackle deductive reasoning has garnered growing attention. It still remains highly challenging to achieve satisfactory results in complex deductive problems, characterized by plenty of premises (i.e., facts or rules) entailing intricate relationships among entities and requiring multi-hop reasoning. One intuitive solution is to decompose the original task into smaller sub-tasks, and then chain the multiple casual reasoning steps together in a forward (e.g., Selection-Inference) or backward (e.g., LAMBADA) direction. However, these techniques inevitably necessitate a large number of overall stages, leading to computationally expensive operations and a higher possibility of making misleading steps. In addition to stage-by-stage decomposition, we draw inspiration from another aspect of human problem-solving. Humans tend to distill the most relevant information and organize their thoughts systematically (e.g., creating mind maps), which assists them in answering questions or drawing conclusions precisely and quickly. In light of this, we propose a novel reasoning approach named Concise and Organized Perception (COP). COP carefully analyzes the given statements to efficiently identify the most pertinent information while eliminating redundancy. It then prompts the LLMs in a more organized form that adapts to the model's inference process. By perceiving concise and organized proofs, the deductive reasoning abilities of LLMs can be better elicited, and the risk of acquiring errors caused by excessive reasoning stages is mitigated. Furthermore, our approach can be combined with the aforementioned ones to further boost their performance. Extensive experimental results on three popular deductive benchmarks (i.e., ProofWriter, PrOntoQA and PrOntoQA-OOD) show that COP significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods.

The emergence of pre-trained AI systems with powerful capabilities across a diverse and ever-increasing set of complex domains has raised a critical challenge for AI safety as tasks can become too complicated for humans to judge directly. Irving et al. [2018] proposed a debate method in this direction with the goal of pitting the power of such AI models against each other until the problem of identifying (mis)-alignment is broken down into a manageable subtask. While the promise of this approach is clear, the original framework was based on the assumption that the honest strategy is able to simulate deterministic AI systems for an exponential number of steps, limiting its applicability. In this paper, we show how to address these challenges by designing a new set of debate protocols where the honest strategy can always succeed using a simulation of a polynomial number of steps, whilst being able to verify the alignment of stochastic AI systems, even when the dishonest strategy is allowed to use exponentially many simulation steps.

We study how to subvert large language models (LLMs) from following prompt-specified rules. We first formalize rule-following as inference in propositional Horn logic, a mathematical system in which rules have the form "if P and Q, then R" for some propositions P, Q, and R. Next, we prove that although small transformers can faithfully follow such rules, maliciously crafted prompts can still mislead both theoretical constructions and models learned from data. Furthermore, we demonstrate that popular attack algorithms on LLMs find adversarial prompts and induce attention patterns that align with our theory. Our novel logic-based framework provides a foundation for studying LLMs in rule-based settings, enabling a formal analysis of tasks like logical reasoning and jailbreak attacks.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have exhibited extraordinary prowess in tasks like mathematics and coding, leveraging their advanced reasoning capabilities. Nevertheless, as these capabilities progress, significant concerns regarding their vulnerabilities and safety have arisen, which can pose challenges to their deployment and application in real-world settings. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of LRMs, meticulously exploring and summarizing the newly emerged safety risks, attacks, and defense strategies. By organizing these elements into a detailed taxonomy, this work aims to offer a clear and structured understanding of the current safety landscape of LRMs, facilitating future research and development to enhance the security and reliability of these powerful models.

In this study, we tackle a growing concern around the safety and ethical use of large language models (LLMs). Despite their potential, these models can be tricked into producing harmful or unethical content through various sophisticated methods, including 'jailbreaking' techniques and targeted manipulation. Our work zeroes in on a specific issue: to what extent LLMs can be led astray by asking them to generate responses that are instruction-centric such as a pseudocode, a program or a software snippet as opposed to vanilla text. To investigate this question, we introduce TechHazardQA, a dataset containing complex queries which should be answered in both text and instruction-centric formats (e.g., pseudocodes), aimed at identifying triggers for unethical responses. We query a series of LLMs -- Llama-2-13b, Llama-2-7b, Mistral-V2 and Mistral 8X7B -- and ask them to generate both text and instruction-centric responses. For evaluation we report the harmfulness score metric as well as judgements from GPT-4 and humans. Overall, we observe that asking LLMs to produce instruction-centric responses enhances the unethical response generation by ~2-38% across the models. As an additional objective, we investigate the impact of model editing using the ROME technique, which further increases the propensity for generating undesirable content. In particular, asking edited LLMs to generate instruction-centric responses further increases the unethical response generation by ~3-16% across the different models.

Reasoning models generate chain-of-thought (CoT) tokens before their final output, but how this affects their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks remains unclear. While traditional language models make refusal decisions at the prompt-response boundary, we find evidence that DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B makes these decisions within its CoT generation. We identify a linear direction in activation space during CoT token generation that predicts whether the model will refuse or comply -- termed the "caution" direction because it corresponds to cautious reasoning patterns in the generated text. Ablating this direction from model activations increases harmful compliance, effectively jailbreaking the model. We additionally show that intervening only on CoT token activations suffices to control final outputs, and that incorporating this direction into prompt-based attacks improves success rates. Our findings suggest that the chain-of-thought itself is a promising new target for adversarial manipulation in reasoning models. Code available at https://github.com/ky295/reasoning-manipulation

Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation. A model can lock onto an unsafe stance early in a long dialogue, yet its final-turn refusal rate may appear indistinguishable from a robustly aligned baseline. To expose these hidden temporal dynamics, we propose a trace-level diagnostic - the CoT-Output 2x2 safety matrix. This framework labels every turn along two independent axes (internal reasoning and visible output), yielding four operationally defined failure cells: robust alignment, alignment faking, overt jailbreak, and a distinct failure mode we term context-injection failure (where the CoT maintains safe reasoning, but the visible output produces harm, highlighting a multi-turn manifestation of reasoning unfaithfulness). We evaluate three distilled reasoning targets against a fixed attacker across five oversight conditions, collecting 6750 turn-level observations on the Information-Hazard scenario. Our analysis reveals two reproducible vulnerabilities: an oversight paradox where explicit monitoring cues paradoxically increase alignment-faking rates rather than suppress them, and a context-injection failure where models lock onto unsafe external outputs despite safe internal states. We release the full dataset of multi-turn dialogues and CoT traces to support follow-up trace-diagnostic research.

Step-by-step reasoning is widely used to enhance the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) in complex problems. Evaluating the quality of reasoning traces is crucial for understanding and improving LLM reasoning. However, the evaluation criteria remain highly unstandardized, leading to fragmented efforts in developing metrics and meta-evaluation benchmarks. To address this gap, this survey provides a comprehensive overview of step-by-step reasoning evaluation, proposing a taxonomy of evaluation criteria with four top-level categories (groundedness, validity, coherence, and utility). We then categorize metrics based on their implementations, survey which metrics are used for assessing each criterion, and explore whether evaluator models can transfer across different criteria. Finally, we identify key directions for future research.

The ability of large language models (LLMs) to follow user instructions is central to their reliability, safety, and usefulness. While prior studies assess instruction adherence in the model's main responses, we argue that it is also critical for large reasoning models (LRMs) to follow user instructions throughout their reasoning process. Reasoning instruction following makes LRMs more controllable and transparent, while reducing risks of undesirable shortcuts, hallucinations, or reward hacking within reasoning traces. To evaluate this dimension, we introduce ReasonIF, a systematic benchmark for assessing reasoning instruction following. ReasonIF includes six categories of instruction prompts, spanning multilingual reasoning, formatting and length control. Across many open-source LRMs including GPT-OSS, Qwen3, and DeepSeek-R1, we find substantial failures in reasoning instruction adherence: the highest instruction following score (IFS) remains below 0.25, meaning that fewer than 25% of reasoning traces comply with the given instructions. Notably, as task difficulty increases, reasoning instruction following degrades further. We also explore two strategies to enhance reasoning instruction fidelity. (1) multi-turn reasoning and (2) Reasoning Instruction Finetuning (RIF) using synthetic data. RIF improves the IFS of GPT-OSS-20B from 0.11 to 0.27, indicating measurable progress but leaving ample room for improvement.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled them to approach human-level persuasion capabilities. However, such potential also raises concerns about the safety risks of LLM-driven persuasion, particularly their potential for unethical influence through manipulation, deception, exploitation of vulnerabilities, and many other harmful tactics. In this work, we present a systematic investigation of LLM persuasion safety through two critical aspects: (1) whether LLMs appropriately reject unethical persuasion tasks and avoid unethical strategies during execution, including cases where the initial persuasion goal appears ethically neutral, and (2) how influencing factors like personality traits and external pressures affect their behavior. To this end, we introduce PersuSafety, the first comprehensive framework for the assessment of persuasion safety which consists of three stages, i.e., persuasion scene creation, persuasive conversation simulation, and persuasion safety assessment. PersuSafety covers 6 diverse unethical persuasion topics and 15 common unethical strategies. Through extensive experiments across 8 widely used LLMs, we observe significant safety concerns in most LLMs, including failing to identify harmful persuasion tasks and leveraging various unethical persuasion strategies. Our study calls for more attention to improve safety alignment in progressive and goal-driven conversations such as persuasion.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex reasoning tasks but remain vulnerable to severe safety risks, including harmful content generation and jailbreak attacks. Existing mitigation strategies rely on injecting heuristic safety signals during training, which often suppress reasoning ability and fail to resolve the safety-reasoning trade-off. To systematically investigate this issue, we analyze the reasoning trajectories of diverse LRMs and uncover a phenomenon we term Self-Jailbreak, where models override their own risk assessments and justify responding to unsafe prompts. This finding reveals that LRMs inherently possess the ability to reject unsafe queries, but this ability is compromised, resulting in harmful outputs. Building on these insights, we propose the Chain-of-Guardrail (CoG), a training framework that recomposes or backtracks unsafe reasoning steps, steering the model back onto safe trajectories while preserving valid reasoning chains. Extensive experiments across multiple reasoning and safety benchmarks demonstrate that CoG substantially improves the safety of current LRMs while preserving comparable reasoning ability, significantly outperforming prior methods that suffer from severe safety-reasoning trade-offs.

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but we show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using their features as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) show that extending the length of reasoning chains significantly improves performance on complex tasks. While revealing these reasoning traces helps users better follow, verify, and learn from the model's problem-solving process, it also makes them highly vulnerable to unauthorized distillation. To mitigate this risk, proprietary model providers often adopt aggressive protection strategies, such as replacing detailed reasoning with brief summaries, which deprive users of valuable intermediate information. To address this trade-off, we propose PART, an information-preserving antidistillation reformulation of reasoning traces. Motivated by the difference between how humans understand reasoning traces and how LLMs exploit them for supervised fine-tuning, we design a simple but effective two-step reformulation: removing self-talk behaviors and reordering sub-conclusions. A small auxiliary model is trained to perform this reformulation, incurring minimal computational overhead. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PART consistently disrupts distillation across student models of different sizes and types on various reasoning benchmarks. For instance, when training on reformulated traces, even the performance of a large 32B student model decreases from 54.17 to 46.88 on AIME 2024, corresponding to a 13.5% degradation.

Following the advancement of large language models (LLMs), the development of LLM-based autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. As a result, the need to understand the security vulnerabilities of these agents has become a critical task. We examine how ReAct agents can be exploited using a straightforward yet effective method we refer to as the foot-in-the-door attack. Our experiments show that indirect prompt injection attacks, prompted by harmless and unrelated requests (such as basic calculations) can significantly increase the likelihood of the agent performing subsequent malicious actions. Our results show that once a ReAct agents thought includes a specific tool or action, the likelihood of executing this tool in the subsequent steps increases significantly, as the agent seldom re-evaluates its actions. Consequently, even random, harmless requests can establish a foot-in-the-door, allowing an attacker to embed malicious instructions into the agents thought process, making it more susceptible to harmful directives. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose implementing a simple reflection mechanism that prompts the agent to reassess the safety of its actions during execution, which can help reduce the success of such attacks.

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through a causal ablation perspective: a successful injection manifests as a dominance shift where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment, such as a retrieved document or tool output, provides disproportionate attributable influence. Based on this signature, we propose CausalArmor, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, leave-one-out ablation-based attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned'' reasoning traces. We present a theoretical analysis showing that sanitization based on attribution margins conditionally yields an exponentially small upper bound on the probability of selecting malicious actions. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses while improving explainability and preserving utility and latency of AI agents.

We present Foundation-Sec-8B-Reasoning, the first open-source native reasoning model for cybersecurity. Built upon our previously released Foundation-Sec-8B base model (derived from Llama-3.1-8B-Base), the model is trained through a two-stage process combining supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR). Our training leverages proprietary reasoning data spanning cybersecurity analysis, instruction-following, and mathematical reasoning. Evaluation across 10 cybersecurity benchmarks and 10 general-purpose benchmarks demonstrates performance competitive with significantly larger models on cybersecurity tasks while maintaining strong general capabilities. The model shows effective generalization on multi-hop reasoning tasks and strong safety performance when deployed with appropriate system prompts and guardrails. This work demonstrates that domain-specialized reasoning models can achieve strong performance on specialized tasks while maintaining broad general capabilities. We release the model publicly at https://huggingface.co/fdtn-ai/Foundation-Sec-8B-Reasoning.

We demonstrate LLM agent specification gaming by instructing models to win against a chess engine. We find reasoning models like o1 preview and DeepSeek-R1 will often hack the benchmark by default, while language models like GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet need to be told that normal play won't work to hack. We improve upon prior work like (Hubinger et al., 2024; Meinke et al., 2024; Weij et al., 2024) by using realistic task prompts and avoiding excess nudging. Our results suggest reasoning models may resort to hacking to solve difficult problems, as observed in OpenAI (2024)'s o1 Docker escape during cyber capabilities testing.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

AI agents powered by reasoning models require access to sensitive user data. However, their reasoning traces are difficult to control, which can result in the unintended leakage of private information to external parties. We propose training models to follow instructions not only in the final answer, but also in reasoning traces, potentially under different constraints. We hypothesize that improving their instruction following abilities in the reasoning traces can improve their privacy-preservation skills. To demonstrate this, we fine-tune models on a new instruction-following dataset with explicit restrictions on reasoning traces. We further introduce a generation strategy that decouples reasoning and answer generation using separate LoRA adapters. We evaluate our approach on six models from two model families, ranging from 1.7B to 14B parameters, across two instruction-following benchmarks and two privacy benchmarks. Our method yields substantial improvements, achieving gains of up to 20.9 points in instruction-following performance and up to 51.9 percentage points on privacy benchmarks. These improvements, however, can come at the cost of task utility, due to the trade-off between reasoning performance and instruction-following abilities. Overall, our results show that improving instruction-following behavior in reasoning models can significantly enhance privacy, suggesting a promising direction for the development of future privacy-aware agents. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/UKPLab/arxiv2026-controllable-reasoning-models

As reasoning capacity and deployment scope grow in tandem, large language models (LLMs) gain the capacity to engage in behaviors that serve their own objectives, a class of risks we term Emergent Strategic Reasoning Risks (ESRRs). These include, but are not limited to, deception (intentionally misleading users or evaluators), evaluation gaming (strategically manipulating performance during safety testing), and reward hacking (exploiting misspecified objectives). Systematically understanding and benchmarking these risks remains an open challenge. To address this gap, we introduce ESRRSim, a taxonomy-driven agentic framework for automated behavioral risk evaluation. We construct an extensible risk taxonomy of 7 categories, which is decomposed into 20 subcategories. ESRRSim generates evaluation scenarios designed to elicit faithful reasoning, paired with dual rubrics assessing both model responses and reasoning traces, in a judge-agnostic and scalable architecture. Evaluation across 11 reasoning LLMs reveals substantial variation in risk profiles (detection rates ranging 14.45%-72.72%), with dramatic generational improvements suggesting models may increasingly recognize and adapt to evaluation contexts.

Large language models (LLMs) are vital for a wide range of applications yet remain susceptible to jailbreak threats, which could lead to the generation of inappropriate responses. Conventional defenses, such as refusal and adversarial training, often fail to cover corner cases or rare domains, leaving LLMs still vulnerable to more sophisticated attacks. We propose a novel defense strategy, Safety Chain-of-Thought (SCoT), which harnesses the enhanced reasoning capabilities of LLMs for proactive assessment of harmful inputs, rather than simply blocking them. SCoT augments any refusal training datasets to critically analyze the intent behind each request before generating answers. By employing proactive reasoning, SCoT enhances the generalization of LLMs across varied harmful queries and scenarios not covered in the safety alignment corpus. Additionally, it generates detailed refusals specifying the rules violated. Comparative evaluations show that SCoT significantly surpasses existing defenses, reducing vulnerability to out-of-distribution issues and adversarial manipulations while maintaining strong general capabilities.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) introduce new opportunities for safety monitoring through their Chain of Thought (CoT) reasoning. However, CoT is not always faithful to the model's final output, undermining its reliability as a monitoring tool. To address this, we investigate the hidden representations of LRMs to determine whether future behavior can be predicted from prompt and CoT representations. By evaluating a probe at each generated token, we construct a probe trajectory, the continuous evolution of a concept's probability across the reasoning process. We find that future model behavior is more distinguishable when examined over the full trajectory than from a single static prediction. To characterize these temporal dynamics, we extract signal-processing features that capture volatility, trend, and steady-state behavior, significantly improving the separation of future model states. We also present two methodological insights. First, template-based training data achieves near-parity with dynamically generated model responses, eliminating the need for a costly initial inference and labeling. Second, the choice of pooling operation is critical: average-pooling and last-token methods collapse to near-random performance, while max-pooling achieves up to 95% AUROC and yields stable probe trajectories. Using four datasets and four reasoning models across the domains of safety and mathematics, we demonstrate that trajectory features encode task-specific dynamics that improve outcome separability. These findings establish probe trajectories as a complementary framework for monitoring LRM behavior. Warning: This article contains potentially harmful content.

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

Reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence that plays a crucial role in activities such as problem solving, decision making, and critical thinking. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in natural language processing, and there is observation that these models may exhibit reasoning abilities when they are sufficiently large. However, it is not yet clear to what extent LLMs are capable of reasoning. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge on reasoning in LLMs, including techniques for improving and eliciting reasoning in these models, methods and benchmarks for evaluating reasoning abilities, findings and implications of previous research in this field, and suggestions on future directions. Our aim is to provide a detailed and up-to-date review of this topic and stimulate meaningful discussion and future work.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Text-to-Image(T2I) models typically deploy safety filters to prevent the generation of sensitive images. Unfortunately, recent jailbreaking attack methods manually design instructions for the LLM to generate adversarial prompts, which effectively bypass safety filters while producing sensitive images, exposing safety vulnerabilities of T2I models. However, due to the LLM's limited understanding of the T2I model and its safety filters, existing methods require numerous queries to achieve a successful attack, limiting their practical applicability. To address this issue, we propose Reason2Attack(R2A), which aims to enhance the LLM's reasoning capabilities in generating adversarial prompts by incorporating the jailbreaking attack into the post-training process of the LLM. Specifically, we first propose a CoT example synthesis pipeline based on Frame Semantics, which generates adversarial prompts by identifying related terms and corresponding context illustrations. Using CoT examples generated by the pipeline, we fine-tune the LLM to understand the reasoning path and format the output structure. Subsequently, we incorporate the jailbreaking attack task into the reinforcement learning process of the LLM and design an attack process reward that considers prompt length, prompt stealthiness, and prompt effectiveness, aiming to further enhance reasoning accuracy. Extensive experiments on various T2I models show that R2A achieves a better attack success ratio while requiring fewer queries than baselines. Moreover, our adversarial prompts demonstrate strong attack transferability across both open-source and commercial T2I models.

Deontic reasoning is the task of answering questions by applying explicit rules and policies to case-specific facts, for example computing tax liability under a statute or determining the outcome of an immigration appeal. A key technical challenge for LLM-based deontic reasoning is that the relevant ruleset can be long and cross-referenced, so models may still fail to locate the rules needed for a particular reasoning step. We introduce Deontic Agentic Reasoning (DAR), an agentic reasoning setup in which the model interacts with the statutes on demand. We evaluate DAR under multiple harnesses on hard subsets of DeonticBench. Across these settings, we find that agentic harnesses can push the frontier on deontic reasoning tasks, but improvements are not uniform: weaker models often degrade on numerical tasks while consuming far more tokens.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant potential in handling complex reasoning tasks through step-by-step rationale generation. However, recent studies have raised concerns regarding the hallucination and flaws in their reasoning process. Substantial efforts are being made to improve the reliability and faithfulness of the generated rationales. Some approaches model reasoning as planning, while others focus on annotating for process supervision. Nevertheless, the planning-based search process often results in high latency due to the frequent assessment of intermediate reasoning states and the extensive exploration space. Additionally, supervising the reasoning process with human annotation is costly and challenging to scale for LLM training. To address these issues, in this paper, we propose a framework to learn planning-based reasoning through direct preference optimization (DPO) on collected trajectories, which are ranked according to synthesized process rewards. Our results on challenging logical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our learning framework, showing that our 7B model can surpass the strong counterparts like GPT-3.5-Turbo.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the development of powerful agentic systems capable of automating complex workflows across various fields. However, these systems are highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in external data can hijack agent behavior. In this work, we present ReasAlign, a model-level solution to improve safety alignment against indirect prompt injection attacks. The core idea of ReasAlign is to incorporate structured reasoning steps to analyze user queries, detect conflicting instructions, and preserve the continuity of the user's intended tasks to defend against indirect injection attacks. To further ensure reasoning logic and accuracy, we introduce a test-time scaling mechanism with a preference-optimized judge model that scores reasoning steps and selects the best trajectory. Comprehensive evaluations across various benchmarks show that ReasAlign maintains utility comparable to an undefended model while consistently outperforming Meta SecAlign, the strongest prior guardrail. On the representative open-ended CyberSecEval2 benchmark, which includes multiple prompt-injected tasks, ReasAlign achieves 94.6% utility and only 3.6% ASR, far surpassing the state-of-the-art defensive model of Meta SecAlign (56.4% utility and 74.4% ASR). These results demonstrate that ReasAlign achieves the best trade-off between security and utility, establishing a robust and practical defense against prompt injection attacks in real-world agentic systems. Our code and experimental results could be found at https://github.com/leolee99/ReasAlign.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into real-world applications, from virtual assistants to autonomous agents. However, their flexibility also introduces new attack vectors-particularly Prompt Injection (PI), where adversaries manipulate model behavior through crafted inputs. As attackers continuously evolve with paraphrased, obfuscated, and even multi-task injection strategies, existing benchmarks are no longer sufficient to capture the full spectrum of emerging threats. To address this gap, we construct a new benchmark that systematically extends prior efforts. Our benchmark subsumes the two widely-used existing ones while introducing new manipulation techniques and multi-task scenarios, thereby providing a more comprehensive evaluation setting. We find that existing defenses, though effective on their original benchmarks, show clear weaknesses under our benchmark, underscoring the need for more robust solutions. Our key insight is that while attack forms may vary, the adversary's intent-injecting an unauthorized task-remains invariant. Building on this observation, we propose PromptSleuth, a semantic-oriented defense framework that detects prompt injection by reasoning over task-level intent rather than surface features. Evaluated across state-of-the-art benchmarks, PromptSleuth consistently outperforms existing defense while maintaining comparable runtime and cost efficiency. These results demonstrate that intent-based semantic reasoning offers a robust, efficient, and generalizable strategy for defending LLMs against evolving prompt injection threats.

Prompting language models to provide step-by-step answers (e.g., "Chain-of-Thought") is the prominent approach for complex reasoning tasks, where more accurate reasoning chains typically improve downstream task performance. Recent literature discusses automatic methods to verify reasoning steps to evaluate and improve their correctness. However, no fine-grained step-level datasets are available to enable thorough evaluation of such verification methods, hindering progress in this direction. We introduce Reveal: Reasoning Verification Evaluation, a new dataset to benchmark automatic verifiers of complex Chain-of-Thought reasoning in open-domain question answering settings. Reveal includes comprehensive labels for the relevance, attribution to evidence passages, and logical correctness of each reasoning step in a language model's answer, across a wide variety of datasets and state-of-the-art language models.

Humans are capable of strategically deceptive behavior: behaving helpfully in most situations, but then behaving very differently in order to pursue alternative objectives when given the opportunity. If an AI system learned such a deceptive strategy, could we detect it and remove it using current state-of-the-art safety training techniques? To study this question, we construct proof-of-concept examples of deceptive behavior in large language models (LLMs). For example, we train models that write secure code when the prompt states that the year is 2023, but insert exploitable code when the stated year is 2024. We find that such backdoored behavior can be made persistent, so that it is not removed by standard safety training techniques, including supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and adversarial training (eliciting unsafe behavior and then training to remove it). The backdoored behavior is most persistent in the largest models and in models trained to produce chain-of-thought reasoning about deceiving the training process, with the persistence remaining even when the chain-of-thought is distilled away. Furthermore, rather than removing backdoors, we find that adversarial training can teach models to better recognize their backdoor triggers, effectively hiding the unsafe behavior. Our results suggest that, once a model exhibits deceptive behavior, standard techniques could fail to remove such deception and create a false impression of safety.

Current literature suggests that alignment faking (deceptive alignment) is an emergent property of large language models. We present the first empirical evidence that a small instruction-tuned model, specifically LLaMA 3 8B, can exhibit alignment faking. We further show that prompt-only interventions, including deontological moral framing and scratchpad reasoning, significantly reduce this behavior without modifying model internals. This challenges the assumption that prompt-based ethics are trivial and that deceptive alignment requires scale. We introduce a taxonomy distinguishing shallow deception, shaped by context and suppressible through prompting, from deep deception, which reflects persistent, goal-driven misalignment. Our findings refine the understanding of deception in language models and underscore the need for alignment evaluations across model sizes and deployment settings.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance on tasks such as mathematics and code generation. Motivated by these strengths, recent work has empirically demonstrated the effectiveness of LRMs as guard models in improving harmful query detection. However, LRMs typically generate long reasoning traces during inference, causing substantial computational overhead. In this paper, we introduce PSRT, a method that replaces the model's reasoning process with a Prefilled Safe Reasoning Trace, thereby significantly reducing the inference cost of LRMs. Concretely, PSRT prefills "safe reasoning virtual tokens" from a constructed dataset and learns over their continuous embeddings. With the aid of indicator tokens, PSRT enables harmful-query detection in a single forward pass while preserving the classification effectiveness of LRMs. We evaluate PSRT on 7 models, 13 datasets, and 8 jailbreak methods. In terms of efficiency, PSRT completely removes the overhead of generating reasoning tokens during inference. In terms of classification performance, PSRT achieves nearly identical accuracy, with only a minor average F1 drop of 0.015 across 7 models and 5 datasets.

State-of-the-art fact-checking systems combat misinformation at scale by employing autonomous LLM-based agents to decompose complex claims into smaller sub-claims, verify each sub-claim individually, and aggregate the partial results to produce verdicts with justifications (explanatory rationales for the verdicts). The security of these systems is crucial, as compromised fact-checkers, which tend to be easily underexplored, can amplify misinformation. This work introduces Fact2Fiction, the first poisoning attack framework targeting such agentic fact-checking systems. Fact2Fiction mirrors the decomposition strategy and exploits system-generated justifications to craft tailored malicious evidences that compromise sub-claim verification. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Fact2Fiction achieves 8.9\%--21.2\% higher attack success rates than state-of-the-art attacks across various poisoning budgets. Fact2Fiction exposes security weaknesses in current fact-checking systems and highlights the need for defensive countermeasures.

Recent advances in Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting have substantially improved the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but have also introduced their computational efficiency as a new attack surface. In this paper, we propose BadThink, the first backdoor attack designed to deliberately induce "overthinking" behavior in CoT-enabled LLMs while ensuring stealth. When activated by carefully crafted trigger prompts, BadThink manipulates the model to generate inflated reasoning traces - producing unnecessarily redundant thought processes while preserving the consistency of final outputs. This subtle attack vector creates a covert form of performance degradation that significantly increases computational costs and inference time while remaining difficult to detect through conventional output evaluation methods. We implement this attack through a sophisticated poisoning-based fine-tuning strategy, employing a novel LLM-based iterative optimization process to embed the behavior by generating highly naturalistic poisoned data. Our experiments on multiple state-of-the-art models and reasoning tasks show that BadThink consistently increases reasoning trace lengths - achieving an over 17x increase on the MATH-500 dataset - while remaining stealthy and robust. This work reveals a critical, previously unexplored vulnerability where reasoning efficiency can be covertly manipulated, demonstrating a new class of sophisticated attacks against CoT-enabled systems.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

We propose VulnLLM-R, the~first specialized reasoning LLM for vulnerability detection. Our key insight is that LLMs can reason about program states and analyze the potential vulnerabilities, rather than simple pattern matching. This can improve the model's generalizability and prevent learning shortcuts. However, SOTA reasoning LLMs are typically ultra-large, closed-source, or have limited performance in vulnerability detection. To address this, we propose a novel training recipe with specialized data selection, reasoning data generation, reasoning data filtering and correction, and testing-phase optimization. Using our proposed methodology, we train a reasoning model with seven billion parameters. Through extensive experiments on SOTA datasets across Python, C/C++, and Java, we show that VulnLLM-R has superior effectiveness and efficiency than SOTA static analysis tools and both open-source and commercial large reasoning models. We further conduct a detailed ablation study to validate the key designs in our training recipe. Finally, we construct an agent scaffold around our model and show that it outperforms CodeQL and AFL++ in real-world projects. Our agent further discovers a set of zero-day vulnerabilities in actively maintained repositories. This work represents a pioneering effort to enable real-world, project-level vulnerability detection using AI agents powered by specialized reasoning models. The code is available at~https://github.com/ucsb-mlsec/VulnLLM-R{github}.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can comply with harmful instructions, raising serious safety concerns despite their impressive capabilities. Recent work has leveraged probing-based approaches to study the separability of malicious and benign inputs in LLMs' internal representations, and researchers have proposed using such probing methods for safety detection. We systematically re-examine this paradigm. Motivated by poor out-of-distribution performance, we hypothesize that probes learn superficial patterns rather than semantic harmfulness. Through controlled experiments, we confirm this hypothesis and identify the specific patterns learned: instructional patterns and trigger words. Our investigation follows a systematic approach, progressing from demonstrating comparable performance of simple n-gram methods, to controlled experiments with semantically cleaned datasets, to detailed analysis of pattern dependencies. These results reveal a false sense of security around current probing-based approaches and highlight the need to redesign both models and evaluation protocols, for which we provide further discussions in the hope of suggesting responsible further research in this direction. We have open-sourced the project at https://github.com/WangCheng0116/Why-Probe-Fails.

Hierarchical reasoning model (HRM) achieves extraordinary performance on various reasoning tasks, significantly outperforming large language model-based reasoners. To understand the strengths and potential failure modes of HRM, we conduct a mechanistic study on its reasoning patterns and find three surprising facts: (a) Failure of extremely simple puzzles, e.g., HRM can fail on a puzzle with only one unknown cell. We attribute this failure to the violation of the fixed point property, a fundamental assumption of HRM. (b) "Grokking" dynamics in reasoning steps, i.e., the answer is not improved uniformly, but instead there is a critical reasoning step that suddenly makes the answer correct; (c) Existence of multiple fixed points. HRM "guesses" the first fixed point, which could be incorrect, and gets trapped there for a while or forever. All facts imply that HRM appears to be "guessing" instead of "reasoning". Leveraging this "guessing" picture, we propose three strategies to scale HRM's guesses: data augmentation (scaling the quality of guesses), input perturbation (scaling the number of guesses by leveraging inference randomness), and model bootstrapping (scaling the number of guesses by leveraging training randomness). On the practical side, by combining all methods, we develop Augmented HRM, boosting accuracy on Sudoku-Extreme from 54.5% to 96.9%. On the scientific side, our analysis provides new insights into how reasoning models "reason".

Chain of Thought (CoT) is significant in improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, the correlation between the effectiveness of CoT and the length of reasoning steps in prompts remains largely unknown. To shed light on this, we have conducted several empirical experiments to explore the relations. Specifically, we design experiments that expand and compress the rationale reasoning steps within CoT demonstrations, while keeping all other factors constant. We have the following key findings. First, the results indicate that lengthening the reasoning steps in prompts, even without adding new information into the prompt, considerably enhances LLMs' reasoning abilities across multiple datasets. Alternatively, shortening the reasoning steps, even while preserving the key information, significantly diminishes the reasoning abilities of models. This finding highlights the importance of the number of steps in CoT prompts and provides practical guidance to make better use of LLMs' potential in complex problem-solving scenarios. Second, we also investigated the relationship between the performance of CoT and the rationales used in demonstrations. Surprisingly, the result shows that even incorrect rationales can yield favorable outcomes if they maintain the requisite length of inference. Third, we observed that the advantages of increasing reasoning steps are task-dependent: simpler tasks require fewer steps, whereas complex tasks gain significantly from longer inference sequences.

We describe our early efforts to red team language models in order to simultaneously discover, measure, and attempt to reduce their potentially harmful outputs. We make three main contributions. First, we investigate scaling behaviors for red teaming across 3 model sizes (2.7B, 13B, and 52B parameters) and 4 model types: a plain language model (LM); an LM prompted to be helpful, honest, and harmless; an LM with rejection sampling; and a model trained to be helpful and harmless using reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). We find that the RLHF models are increasingly difficult to red team as they scale, and we find a flat trend with scale for the other model types. Second, we release our dataset of 38,961 red team attacks for others to analyze and learn from. We provide our own analysis of the data and find a variety of harmful outputs, which range from offensive language to more subtly harmful non-violent unethical outputs. Third, we exhaustively describe our instructions, processes, statistical methodologies, and uncertainty about red teaming. We hope that this transparency accelerates our ability to work together as a community in order to develop shared norms, practices, and technical standards for how to red team language models.

While reinforcement learning-trained Large Reasoning Models (LRMs, e.g., Deepseek-R1) demonstrate advanced reasoning capabilities in the evolving Large Language Models (LLMs) domain, their susceptibility to security threats remains a critical vulnerability. This weakness is particularly evident in Chain-of-Thought (CoT) generation processes, where adversarial methods like backdoor prompt attacks can systematically subvert the model's core reasoning mechanisms. The emerging Chain-of-Thought Attack (CoTA) reveals this vulnerability through exploiting prompt controllability, simultaneously degrading both CoT safety and task performance with low-cost interventions. To address this compounded security-performance vulnerability, we propose Thought Purity (TP): a defense paradigm that systematically strengthens resistance to malicious content while preserving operational efficacy. Our solution achieves this through three synergistic components: (1) a safety-optimized data processing pipeline (2) reinforcement learning-enhanced rule constraints (3) adaptive monitoring metrics. Our approach establishes the first comprehensive defense mechanism against CoTA vulnerabilities in reinforcement learning-aligned reasoning systems, significantly advancing the security-functionality equilibrium for next-generation AI architectures.

Despite extensive safety-tuning, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks via adversarially crafted instructions, reflecting a persistent trade-off between safety and task performance. In this work, we propose Intent-FT, a simple and lightweight fine-tuning approach that explicitly trains LLMs to infer the underlying intent of an instruction before responding. By fine-tuning on a targeted set of adversarial instructions, Intent-FT enables LLMs to generalize intent deduction to unseen attacks, thereby substantially improving their robustness. We comprehensively evaluate both parametric and non-parametric attacks across open-source and proprietary models, considering harmfulness from attacks, utility, over-refusal, and impact against white-box threats. Empirically, Intent-FT consistently mitigates all evaluated attack categories, with no single attack exceeding a 50\% success rate -- whereas existing defenses remain only partially effective. Importantly, our method preserves the model's general capabilities and reduces excessive refusals on benign instructions containing superficially harmful keywords. Furthermore, models trained with Intent-FT accurately identify hidden harmful intent in adversarial attacks, and these learned intentions can be effectively transferred to enhance vanilla model defenses. We publicly release our code at https://github.com/wj210/Intent_Jailbreak.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable generative capabilities. However, their susceptibility to misuse has raised significant safety concerns. While post-training safety alignment methods have been widely adopted, LLMs remain vulnerable to malicious instructions that can bypass safety constraints. Recent efforts have introduced inference-time safety reasoning (system-2 alignment), where LLMs conduct a reasoning process to perform safety verification before final response. We show, however, that these checks are driven by ad-hoc reasoning that diverges from the structured human process, where they first discern a user's true intent, then evaluate the associated risk based on the true intent. Consequently, these defenses remain vulnerable to sophisticated jailbreak prompts that cloak harmful goals in seemingly benign language. To build secure and safe LLMs, we propose a reasoning-based safety alignment framework, ARMOR, that replaces the ad-hoc chains of thought reasoning process with human-aligned, structured one. At inference, ARMOR (1) detects likely jailbreak strategies, (2) extracts the user's core intent while discarding deceptive instructions, and (3) applies a policy-grounded safety analysis to the purified request. ARMOR is evaluated on adaptive jailbreak attacks and multiple safety benchmarks, and a test-time scaling is conducted to further improve its performance. Results demonstrate that ARMOR significantly enhances the robustness against state-of-the-art adaptive jailbreak attacks and outperforms recent reasoning-based aligned models across various safety benchmarks.

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent systems, understanding adversarial manipulation becomes critical for defensive design. We present a systematic study of intentional deception as an engineered capability, using LLM-to-LLM interactions within a text-based RPG where parameterized behavioral profiles (9 alignments x 4 motivations, yielding 36 profiles with explicit ethical ground truth) serve as our experimental testbed. Unlike accidental deception from misalignment, we investigate a two-stage system that infers target agent characteristics and generates deceptive responses steering targets toward actions counter to their beliefs and motivations. We find that deceptive intervention produces differential effects concentrated in specific behavioral profiles rather than distributed uniformly, and that 88.5% of successful deceptions employ misdirection (true statements with strategic framing) rather than fabrication, indicating fact-checking defenses would miss the large majority of adversarial responses. Motivation, inferable at 98%+ accuracy, serves as the primary attack vector, while belief systems remain harder to identify (49% inference ceiling) or exploit. These findings identify which agent profiles require additional safeguards and suggest that current fact-verification approaches are insufficient against strategically framed deception.

Reasoning methods that adaptively allocate test-time compute have advanced LLM performance on easy to verify domains such as math and code. In this work, we study how to utilize this approach to train models that exhibit a degree of robustness to safety vulnerabilities, and show that doing so can provide benefits. We build a recipe called TARS (Training Adaptive Reasoners for Safety), a reinforcement learning (RL) approach that trains models to reason about safety using chain-of-thought traces and a reward signal that balances safety with task completion. To build TARS, we identify three critical design choices: (1) a "lightweight" warmstart SFT stage, (2) a mix of harmful, harmless, and ambiguous prompts to prevent shortcut behaviors such as too many refusals, and (3) a reward function to prevent degeneration of reasoning capabilities during training. Models trained with TARS exhibit adaptive behaviors by spending more compute on ambiguous queries, leading to better safety-refusal trade-offs. They also internally learn to better distinguish between safe and unsafe prompts and attain greater robustness to both white-box (e.g., GCG) and black-box attacks (e.g., PAIR). Overall, our work provides an effective, open recipe for training LLMs against jailbreaks and harmful requests by reasoning per prompt.

Agentic workflows -- where multiple large language model (LLM) instances interact to solve tasks -- are increasingly built on feedback mechanisms, where one model evaluates and critiques another. Despite the promise of feedback-driven improvement, the stability of agentic workflows rests on the reliability of the judge. However, judges may hallucinate information, exhibit bias, or act adversarially -- introducing critical vulnerabilities into the workflow. In this work, we present a systematic analysis of agentic workflows under deceptive or misleading feedback. We introduce a two-dimensional framework for analyzing judge behavior, along axes of intent (from constructive to malicious) and knowledge (from parametric-only to retrieval-augmented systems). Using this taxonomy, we construct a suite of judge behaviors and develop WAFER-QA, a new benchmark with critiques grounded in retrieved web evidence to evaluate robustness of agentic workflows against factually supported adversarial feedback. We reveal that even strongest agents are vulnerable to persuasive yet flawed critiques -- often switching correct answers after a single round of misleading feedback. Taking a step further, we study how model predictions evolve over multiple rounds of interaction, revealing distinct behavioral patterns between reasoning and non-reasoning models. Our findings highlight fundamental vulnerabilities in feedback-based workflows and offer guidance for building more robust agentic systems.

Artificial agents have traditionally been trained to maximize reward, which may incentivize power-seeking and deception, analogous to how next-token prediction in language models (LMs) may incentivize toxicity. So do agents naturally learn to be Machiavellian? And how do we measure these behaviors in general-purpose models such as GPT-4? Towards answering these questions, we introduce MACHIAVELLI, a benchmark of 134 Choose-Your-Own-Adventure games containing over half a million rich, diverse scenarios that center on social decision-making. Scenario labeling is automated with LMs, which are more performant than human annotators. We mathematize dozens of harmful behaviors and use our annotations to evaluate agents' tendencies to be power-seeking, cause disutility, and commit ethical violations. We observe some tension between maximizing reward and behaving ethically. To improve this trade-off, we investigate LM-based methods to steer agents' towards less harmful behaviors. Our results show that agents can both act competently and morally, so concrete progress can currently be made in machine ethics--designing agents that are Pareto improvements in both safety and capabilities.

LLM-based agent architectures systematically conflate information transport mechanisms with epistemic justification mechanisms. We formalize this class of architectural failures as semantic laundering: a pattern where propositions with absent or weak warrant are accepted by the system as admissible by crossing architecturally trusted interfaces. We show that semantic laundering constitutes an architectural realization of the Gettier problem: propositions acquire high epistemic status without a connection between their justification and what makes them true. Unlike classical Gettier cases, this effect is not accidental; it is architecturally determined and systematically reproducible. The central result is the Theorem of Inevitable Self-Licensing: under standard architectural assumptions, circular epistemic justification cannot be eliminated. We introduce the Warrant Erosion Principle as the fundamental explanation for this effect and show that scaling, model improvement, and LLM-as-judge schemes are structurally incapable of eliminating a problem that exists at the type level.

Deductive reasoning is the process of deriving conclusions strictly from the given premises, without relying on external knowledge. We define honesty in this setting as a model's ability to respond only when the conclusion is logically entailed by the premises, and to abstain otherwise. However, current language models often fail to reason honestly, producing unwarranted answers when the input is insufficient. To study this challenge, we formulate honest deductive reasoning as multi-step tasks where models must either derive the correct conclusion or abstain. We curate two datasets from graph structures, one for linear algebra and one for logical inference, and introduce unanswerable cases by randomly perturbing an edge in half of the instances. We find that prompting and existing training methods, including GRPO with or without supervised fine-tuning initialization, struggle on these tasks. In particular, GRPO optimize only for final task outcomes, leaving models vulnerable to collapse when negative rewards dominate early training. To address this, we propose ACNCHOR, a reinforcement learning method that injects ground truth trajectories into rollouts, preventing early training collapse. Our results demonstrate that this method stabilizes learning and significantly improves the overall reasoning performance, underscoring the importance of training dynamics for enabling honest deductive reasoning in language models.

Mental manipulation severely undermines mental wellness by covertly and negatively distorting decision-making. While there is an increasing interest in mental health care within the natural language processing community, progress in tackling manipulation remains limited due to the complexity of detecting subtle, covert tactics in conversations. In this paper, we propose Intent-Aware Prompting (IAP), a novel approach for detecting mental manipulations using large language models (LLMs), providing a deeper understanding of manipulative tactics by capturing the underlying intents of participants. Experimental results on the MentalManip dataset demonstrate superior effectiveness of IAP against other advanced prompting strategies. Notably, our approach substantially reduces false negatives, helping detect more instances of mental manipulation with minimal misjudgment of positive cases. The code of this paper is available at https://github.com/Anton-Jiayuan-MA/Manip-IAP.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities given chain-of-thought prompts (examples with intermediate reasoning steps). Existing benchmarks measure reasoning ability indirectly, by evaluating accuracy on downstream tasks such as mathematical reasoning. However, it is unclear how these models obtain the answers and whether they rely on simple heuristics rather than the generated chain-of-thought. To enable systematic exploration of the reasoning ability of LLMs, we present a new synthetic question-answering dataset called PrOntoQA, where each example is generated from a synthetic world model represented in first-order logic. This allows us to parse the generated chain-of-thought into symbolic proofs for formal analysis. Our analysis on InstructGPT and GPT-3 shows that LLMs are quite capable of making correct individual deduction steps, and so are generally capable of reasoning, even in fictional contexts. However, they have difficulty with proof planning: When multiple valid deduction steps are available, they are not able to systematically explore the different options.

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

Reasoning abilities of LLMs have been a key focus in recent years. One challenging reasoning domain with interesting nuances is legal reasoning, which requires careful application of rules, and precedents while balancing deductive and analogical reasoning, and conflicts between rules. Although there have been a few works on using LLMs for legal reasoning, their focus has been on overall accuracy. In this paper, we dig deeper to do a step-by-step analysis and figure out where they commit errors. We use the college-level Multiple Choice Question-Answering (MCQA) task from the Civil Procedure dataset and propose a new error taxonomy derived from initial manual analysis of reasoning chains with respect to several LLMs, including two objective measures: soundness and correctness scores. We then develop an LLM-based automated evaluation framework to identify reasoning errors and evaluate the performance of LLMs. The computation of soundness and correctness on the dataset using the auto-evaluator framework reveals several interesting insights. Furthermore, we show that incorporating the error taxonomy as feedback in popular prompting techniques marginally increases LLM performance. Our work will also serve as an evaluation framework that can be used in detailed error analysis of reasoning chains for logic-intensive complex tasks.

This work provides an explanatory view of how LLMs can apply moral reasoning to both criticize and defend sexist language. We assessed eight large language models, all of which demonstrated the capability to provide explanations grounded in varying moral perspectives for both critiquing and endorsing views that reflect sexist assumptions. With both human and automatic evaluation, we show that all eight models produce comprehensible and contextually relevant text, which is helpful in understanding diverse views on how sexism is perceived. Also, through analysis of moral foundations cited by LLMs in their arguments, we uncover the diverse ideological perspectives in models' outputs, with some models aligning more with progressive or conservative views on gender roles and sexism. Based on our observations, we caution against the potential misuse of LLMs to justify sexist language. We also highlight that LLMs can serve as tools for understanding the roots of sexist beliefs and designing well-informed interventions. Given this dual capacity, it is crucial to monitor LLMs and design safety mechanisms for their use in applications that involve sensitive societal topics, such as sexism.

Smartphone scams are increasingly prevalent and typically manifest as multi-stage, cross-application processes with gradually emerging intent. Effective intervention thus requires anticipating scams before the intent becomes explicit. This is inherently challenging, as decisions must rely on partial trajectories with temporally distributed evidence. In this paper, we propose ORACLE Online Reasoning for Anticipating Cross-temporal Latent thrEats, the first agentic framework for early scam anticipation from streaming app-usage trajectories. To support this setting, we curate a real-world long-horizon benchmark of streaming app-usage trajectories, covering 12 scam types, spanning extended periods (15 days on average), involving diverse applications (95 apps), and interleaving normal and scam behaviors. To address fragmented evidence, we introduce a self-evolving context manager that adaptively consolidates entity-centric interactions over time, enabling more effective reconstruction of cross-temporal evidence from partial observations. To enhance sensitivity to latent early-stage signals, we propose an on-policy self-distillation scheme in which a teacher model, conditioned on summarized anti-scam reflections and clues by skills, supervises a student model without access to such reflections. This scheme thereby distills evidence-informed knowledge and improves recognition of emerging fraud patterns from partial trajectories. Experiments show that consistently improves early scam anticipation, yielding timely warnings while reducing false alerts in realistic streaming scenarios.

Without proper safeguards, large language models will readily follow malicious instructions and generate toxic content. This motivates safety efforts such as red-teaming and large-scale feedback learning, which aim to make models both helpful and harmless. However, there is a tension between these two objectives, since harmlessness requires models to refuse complying with unsafe prompts, and thus not be helpful. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that some models may have struck a poor balance, so that even clearly safe prompts are refused if they use similar language to unsafe prompts or mention sensitive topics. In this paper, we introduce a new test suite called XSTest to identify such eXaggerated Safety behaviours in a structured and systematic way. In its current form, XSTest comprises 200 safe prompts across ten prompt types that well-calibrated models should not refuse to comply with. We describe XSTest's creation and composition, and use the test suite to highlight systematic failure modes in a recently-released state-of-the-art language model.

Defending large language models (LLMs) against jailbreak attacks is essential for their safe and reliable deployment. Existing defenses often rely on shallow pattern matching, which struggles to generalize to novel and unseen attack strategies. To address this challenge, we propose the Cognitive-Driven Defense (CDD) framework, which targets the underlying structure of jailbreak prompts by applying meta-operations, defined as basic manipulations that conceal harmful intent.CDD emulates human cognitive reasoning through a structured reasoning chain. It begins with a global perception of the prompt and follows with a localized analysis to uncover hidden manipulations. By applying supervised fine-tuning on this structured chain, the model learns to identify and reason about known manipulation patterns. To enhance generalization to unseen threats, an entropy-guided reinforcement learning algorithm (EG-GRPO) is introduced to encourage exploration of new types and variants of meta-operations. Experiments demonstrate that CDD can achieve state-of-the-art defense performance and exhibit strong generalization to unseen jailbreak attacks.

As large language models (LLMs) become an important way of information access, there have been increasing concerns that LLMs may intensify the spread of unethical content, including implicit bias that hurts certain populations without explicit harmful words. In this paper, we conduct a rigorous evaluation of LLMs' implicit bias towards certain demographics by attacking them from a psychometric perspective to elicit agreements to biased viewpoints. Inspired by psychometric principles in cognitive and social psychology, we propose three attack approaches, i.e., Disguise, Deception, and Teaching. Incorporating the corresponding attack instructions, we built two benchmarks: (1) a bilingual dataset with biased statements covering four bias types (2.7K instances) for extensive comparative analysis, and (2) BUMBLE, a larger benchmark spanning nine common bias types (12.7K instances) for comprehensive evaluation. Extensive evaluation of popular commercial and open-source LLMs shows that our methods can elicit LLMs' inner bias more effectively than competitive baselines. Our attack methodology and benchmarks offer an effective means of assessing the ethical risks of LLMs, driving progress toward greater accountability in their development. Our code, data and benchmarks are available at https://github.com/yuchenwen1/ImplicitBiasPsychometricEvaluation and https://github.com/yuchenwen1/BUMBLE.

Recent advances in large reasoning models (LRMs) have enabled remarkable performance on complex tasks such as mathematics and coding by generating long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) traces. In this paper, we identify and systematically analyze a critical vulnerability we term reasoning distraction, where LRMs are diverted from their primary objective by irrelevant yet complex tasks maliciously embedded in the prompt. Through a comprehensive study across diverse models and benchmarks, we show that even state-of-the-art LRMs are highly susceptible, with injected distractors reducing task accuracy by up to 60%. We further reveal that certain alignment techniques can amplify this weakness and that models may exhibit covert compliance, following hidden adversarial instructions in reasoning while concealing them in the final output. To mitigate these risks, we propose a training-based defense that combines Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) on synthetic adversarial data, improving robustness by over 50 points on challenging distractor attacks. Our findings establish reasoning distraction as a distinct and urgent threat to LRM reliability and provide a practical step toward safer and more trustworthy reasoning systems.

Deductive reasoning is a crucial logical capability that assists us in solving complex problems based on existing knowledge. Although augmented by Chain-of-Thought prompts, Large Language Models (LLMs) might not follow the correct reasoning paths. Enhancing the deductive reasoning abilities of LLMs, and leveraging their extensive built-in knowledge for various reasoning tasks, remains an open question. Attempting to mimic the human deductive reasoning paradigm, we propose a multi-stage Syllogistic-Reasoning Framework of Thought (SR-FoT) that enables LLMs to perform syllogistic deductive reasoning to handle complex knowledge-based reasoning tasks. Our SR-FoT begins by interpreting the question and then uses the interpretation and the original question to propose a suitable major premise. It proceeds by generating and answering minor premise questions in two stages to match the minor premises. Finally, it guides LLMs to use the previously generated major and minor premises to perform syllogistic deductive reasoning to derive the answer to the original question. Extensive and thorough experiments on knowledge-based reasoning tasks have demonstrated the effectiveness and advantages of our SR-FoT.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are highly proficient in language-based tasks. Their language capabilities have positioned them at the forefront of the future AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) race. However, on closer inspection, Valmeekam et al. (2024); Zecevic et al. (2023); Wu et al. (2024) highlight a significant gap between their language proficiency and reasoning abilities. Reasoning in LLMs and Vision Language Models (VLMs) aims to bridge this gap by enabling these models to think and re-evaluate their actions and responses. Reasoning is an essential capability for complex problem-solving and a necessary step toward establishing trust in Artificial Intelligence (AI). This will make AI suitable for deployment in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, banking, law, defense, security etc. In recent times, with the advent of powerful reasoning models like OpenAI O1 and DeepSeek R1, reasoning endowment has become a critical research topic in LLMs. In this paper, we provide a detailed overview and comparison of existing reasoning techniques and present a systematic survey of reasoning-imbued language models. We also study current challenges and present our findings.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve answer quality through explicit chain-of-thought, yet this very capability introduces new safety risks: harmful content can be subtly injected, surface gradually, or be justified by misleading rationales within the reasoning trace. Existing safety evaluations, however, primarily focus on output-level judgments and rarely capture these dynamic risks along the reasoning process. In this paper, we present SafeRBench, the first benchmark that assesses LRM safety end-to-end -- from inputs and intermediate reasoning to final outputs. (1) Input Characterization: We pioneer the incorporation of risk categories and levels into input design, explicitly accounting for affected groups and severity, and thereby establish a balanced prompt suite reflecting diverse harm gradients. (2) Fine-Grained Output Analysis: We introduce a micro-thought chunking mechanism to segment long reasoning traces into semantically coherent units, enabling fine-grained evaluation across ten safety dimensions. (3) Human Safety Alignment: We validate LLM-based evaluations against human annotations specifically designed to capture safety judgments. Evaluations on 19 LRMs demonstrate that SafeRBench enables detailed, multidimensional safety assessment, offering insights into risks and protective mechanisms from multiple perspectives.

As models increasingly leverage multi-step reasoning strategies to solve complex problems, supervising the logical validity of these intermediate steps has become a critical research challenge. Process reward models address this by providing step-by-step feedback, but current approaches have two major drawbacks: they typically function as classifiers without providing explanations, and their reliance on supervised fine-tuning with static datasets limits generalization. Inspired by recent advances, we reframe stepwise reward modeling from a classification task to a reasoning task itself. We thus propose a generative judge that reasons about the policy model's reasoning steps (i.e., meta-reasons), outputting thinking tokens before delivering a final verdict. Our model, StepWiser, is trained by reinforcement learning using relative outcomes of rollouts. We show it provides (i) better judgment accuracy on intermediate steps than existing methods; (ii) can be used to improve the policy model at training time; and (iii) improves inference-time search.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) display versatile functionality, they continue to generate harmful, biased, and toxic content, as demonstrated by the prevalence of human-designed jailbreaks. In this work, we present Tree of Attacks with Pruning (TAP), an automated method for generating jailbreaks that only requires black-box access to the target LLM. TAP utilizes an LLM to iteratively refine candidate (attack) prompts using tree-of-thoughts reasoning until one of the generated prompts jailbreaks the target. Crucially, before sending prompts to the target, TAP assesses them and prunes the ones unlikely to result in jailbreaks. Using tree-of-thought reasoning allows TAP to navigate a large search space of prompts and pruning reduces the total number of queries sent to the target. In empirical evaluations, we observe that TAP generates prompts that jailbreak state-of-the-art LLMs (including GPT4 and GPT4-Turbo) for more than 80% of the prompts using only a small number of queries. This significantly improves upon the previous state-of-the-art black-box method for generating jailbreaks.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on long-term memory and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to persist experiences and refine future performance. While this experience learning capability enhances agentic autonomy, it introduces a critical, unexplored attack surface, i.e., the trust boundary between an agent's reasoning core and its own past. In this paper, we introduce MemoryGraft. It is a novel indirect injection attack that compromises agent behavior not through immediate jailbreaks, but by implanting malicious successful experiences into the agent's long-term memory. Unlike traditional prompt injections that are transient, or standard RAG poisoning that targets factual knowledge, MemoryGraft exploits the agent's semantic imitation heuristic which is the tendency to replicate patterns from retrieved successful tasks. We demonstrate that an attacker who can supply benign ingestion-level artifacts that the agent reads during execution can induce it to construct a poisoned RAG store where a small set of malicious procedure templates is persisted alongside benign experiences. When the agent later encounters semantically similar tasks, union retrieval over lexical and embedding similarity reliably surfaces these grafted memories, and the agent adopts the embedded unsafe patterns, leading to persistent behavioral drift across sessions. We validate MemoryGraft on MetaGPT's DataInterpreter agent with GPT-4o and find that a small number of poisoned records can account for a large fraction of retrieved experiences on benign workloads, turning experience-based self-improvement into a vector for stealthy and durable compromise. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and evaluation data are available at https://github.com/Jacobhhy/Agent-Memory-Poisoning.

Root cause analysis (RCA) is essential for diagnosing failures within complex software systems to ensure system reliability. The highly distributed and interdependent nature of modern cloud-based systems often complicates RCA efforts, particularly for multi-hop fault propagation, where symptoms appear far from their true causes. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) present new opportunities to enhance automated RCA. However, their practical value for RCA depends on the fidelity of reasoning and decision-making. Existing work relies on historical incident corpora, operates directly on high-volume telemetry beyond current LLM capacity, or embeds reasoning inside complex multi-agent pipelines -- conditions that obscure whether failures arise from reasoning itself or from peripheral design choices. We present a focused empirical evaluation that isolates an LLM's reasoning behavior. We design a controlled experimental framework that foregrounds the LLM by using a simplified experimental setting. We evaluate six LLMs under two agentic workflows (ReAct and Plan-and-Execute) and a non-agentic baseline on two real-world case studies (GAIA and OpenRCA). In total, we executed 48,000 simulated failure scenarios, totaling 228 days of execution time. We measure both root-cause accuracy and the quality of intermediate reasoning traces. We produce a labeled taxonomy of 16 common RCA reasoning failures and use an LLM-as-a-Judge for annotation. Our results clarify where current open-source LLMs succeed and fail in multi-hop RCA, quantify sensitivity to input data modalities, and identify reasoning failures that predict final correctness. Together, these contributions provide transparent and reproducible empirical results and a failure taxonomy to guide future work on reasoning-driven system diagnosis.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) often rely on generating intermediate reasoning steps to enhance accuracy. However, little work has examined how reasoning utility contributes to the final answer's correctness. Due to the stochastic nature of autoregressive generation, generating more context does not guarantee increased confidence in the answer. If we could predict, during generation, whether a reasoning step will be useful, we could stop early or prune ineffective steps, avoiding distractions in the final decision. We present an oracle study on MATH dataset, using Qwen2.5-32B and GPT-4o to generate reasoning chains, and then employing a separate model (Qwen3-8B) to quantify the utility of these chains for final accuracy. Specifically, we measure the model's uncertainty on the answer span Y at each reasoning step using conditional entropy (expected negative log-likelihood over the vocabulary) with context expanding step by step. Our results show a clear pattern: conditional entropy that decreases over steps is strongly associated with correct answers, whereas flat or increasing entropy often results in wrong answers. We also corroborate that incorrect reasoning paths tend to be longer than correct ones, suggesting that longer reasoning does not necessarily yield better outcomes. These findings serve as a foundation to inspire future work on designing efficient reasoning pipelines that detect and avoid unproductive reasoning early.

Leveraging the rapid development of Large Language Models LLMs, LLM-based agents have been developed to handle various real-world applications, including finance, healthcare, and shopping, etc. It is crucial to ensure the reliability and security of LLM-based agents during applications. However, the safety issues of LLM-based agents are currently under-explored. In this work, we take the first step to investigate one of the typical safety threats, backdoor attack, to LLM-based agents. We first formulate a general framework of agent backdoor attacks, then we present a thorough analysis on the different forms of agent backdoor attacks. Specifically, from the perspective of the final attacking outcomes, the attacker can either choose to manipulate the final output distribution, or only introduce malicious behavior in the intermediate reasoning process, while keeping the final output correct. Furthermore, the former category can be divided into two subcategories based on trigger locations: the backdoor trigger can be hidden either in the user query or in an intermediate observation returned by the external environment. We propose the corresponding data poisoning mechanisms to implement the above variations of agent backdoor attacks on two typical agent tasks, web shopping and tool utilization. Extensive experiments show that LLM-based agents suffer severely from backdoor attacks, indicating an urgent need for further research on the development of defenses against backdoor attacks on LLM-based agents. Warning: This paper may contain biased content.

Large Language Models (LLMs), despite advances in safety alignment, remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks designed to circumvent protective mechanisms. Prevailing defense strategies rely on external interventions, such as input filtering or output modification, which often lack generalizability and compromise model utility while incurring significant computational overhead. In this work, we introduce a new, training-free defense paradigm, Self-Activating Internal Defense (SAID), which reframes the defense task from external correction to internal capability activation. SAID uniquely leverages the LLM's own reasoning abilities to proactively identify and neutralize malicious intent through a three-stage pipeline: model-native intent distillation to extract core semantics, optimal safety prefix probing to activate latent safety awareness, and a conservative aggregation strategy to ensure robust decision-making. Extensive experiments on five open-source LLMs against six advanced jailbreak attacks demonstrate that SAID substantially outperforms state-of-the-art defenses in reducing harmful outputs. Crucially, it achieves this while preserving model performance on benign tasks and incurring minimal computational overhead. Our work establishes that activating the intrinsic safety mechanisms of LLMs is a more robust and scalable path toward building safer and more reliable aligned AI systems.